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English No 4, Jul-Aug 89pp 218-221

**[Text] COUNTRIES OF ASIA: STATE POLICY
TOWARDS SMALL BUSINESS**

V.N. ULYAKHIN

In Oriental countries the state actively influences the development of small enterprise, ensuring in fact equal possibilities for evolution for all sectors of economy, in all fields of activities, as concerns deliveries of scarce goods, allocation of investments, training of qualified personnel and the taxation, both direct and indirect. Facing the necessity of priority development of science- and capital-intensive branches which would pay for themselves in the long run, developing countries of Asia finally succeed in finding such a compromise solution that foresees in the long-term perspective a join of increasing quantities of living and materialized labour, i.e. is based on combination of labour-, capital- and science-intensive productions and intended for well-balanced growth of small-scale, big capitalist and state sectors.

From this point, the experience of Asian countries is of a certain importance for developing small (in particular, co-operative) sector in the USSR. The recently adopted laws on the state enterprise, the co-operation and the individual labour activities meant a legal acknowledgement of such objective reality as the multi-sector nature of Soviet economy. However, the perestroika in general has not shaken the monopoly of state property, and this makes possible negative processes in economy to grow without hindrance. The state sector still stays apart from any competition. Only secondary roles are still assigned to co-operative and self-employed workers. In the existing conditions they are not able to organize any important production while co-operators could successfully ensure, for instance, a small-series production of mini-tractors, mini-combines, electronic equipment and electrotechnical devices, as well as the small enterprises perform this function in practically all countries of Asia. But this way is still firmly blocked by a deep-rooted dogma in our consciousness that proclaimed the state property to be a priori the height of perfection.

STANDARD OF NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

M.A. OLIMOV

One could not deny that the building of socialism in majority of socialist-oriented states was realized under strong influence of the Soviet experience which was advocated by our theorists as the basic model of socialism. They wrote piles of works pretending to give analysis of the non-capitalist way of development in Central Asian Soviet republics, recommended as a standard for young states of the "third world." However, these works were completely out of touch with reality, ignoring existing problems and difficulties. But recently,

when monstrous distortions of socialist principles in Soviet Asian republics came to light, they puzzled many theorists of social sciences and party workers, unmasked complexity and contradictions of the real socialism and its ways.

In the author's opinion, we should admit that problems actually faced by the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are similar to those of developing countries of the East (to some extent this includes also countries which develop on the capitalist way). Dangers that threaten these peoples in general are connected with accelerated path of historical development, negative influence of the whole underdevelopment in the pre-socialist period, the heritage of feudalism. The article scrutinizes a key problem of this heritage—the conservation and functioning of the traditional society in Soviet Asian republics.

The socialism built under Stalin's direction was itself a model of feudal community. Its features were paternalism, hierarchic and caste structure, use of a powerful compulsion machinery. In Central Asian republics the hierarchy of Stalin's socialism joined the hierarchy of the old feudal system. Institutes of traditional society which still remain attractive for masses, in the epoch of stagnation became a good camouflage for money-grubbing and corruption. Forcibly spread wage-levelling also contributed to the conservation of the feudal type community. The wage-levelling of the barrack-like socialism was close by nature to the feudal levelling and therefore easily took root in mass conscience.

**AFRICA. DIFFERENT ORIENTATIONS AND
COMMON PROBLEMS. ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
POLICY IN COUNTRIES OF ALTERNATIVE ORIENTATIONS**

Yu.V. POTYOMKIN

Scepticism towards possibilities of socialist-oriented policy in developing countries, which became widespread lately among Soviet researchers, is a sort of retroactive reaction to the overestimated realities in the past. However, considering the capitalist and the socialist orientations of development we should not exaggerate their difference, which is strict enough in the political and ideological field but is less important in the social and economic sphere. This is quite natural, because the main tasks of overcoming backwardness faced by developing countries are similar if not identical. Their essence is the accelerated creation of the potential for this overcoming, all possible development of productive forces, both material and human. This circumstance inevitably reduces the social and economic difference between the two alternative lines to non-significant variations in proportions of certain aims and methods of policy in countries of both orientations at the present stage. This thesis is confirmed in the article by a review of the policy of African states on main problems dealing with vital people's interests, i.e. the essential, human component of productive forces.

In the author's opinion, the degradation of social and economic situation on the continent in 1980s, connected in fact mainly with objective factors, cannot be explained merely by the socialist-oriented way. It would be wrong also to compare results achieved in countries of both types for a too short historical period; to consider measures of normalization as a deviation from the socialist orientation; to interpret this orientation as a stage of "building of socialism." This is a long-range policy, and its destinies are not determined by factors of conjuncture. Its necessary pre-conditions are the existence of a solid economic basis—the public sector of the economy, while not necessarily predominant, and the conviction of political leaders in a historical need for socialist orientation.

TURKISH ASPECTS OF TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND SOME MISTAKES OF STALINIST DIPLOMACY

A.Sh. RASIZADE

While Greek events and the situation about Turkey were the occasion to proclaim the doctrine, its Greek and Turkish aspects haven't been yet a special subject of study in our country. However, the Truman doctrine played a crucial role in American-Turkish relations, in the choice by Turkey of its place in the post-war world, and this influenced, of course, the Soviet-Turkish relations as well. The principles of the doctrine still stay the basis of bilateral relations between Turkey and the USA.

The author tried to reconsider the Soviet interpretation of the Truman doctrine. Now, when we review our past, it is useful to show consequences of the wrong approach by I.V. Stalin and his associates to the Soviet policy in the region.

The Soviet-Turkish relations reached a high level of tension during first post-war years. In course of the second world war Turkey took in fact anti-Soviet positions, and after the war the Soviet government denounced the Treaty on friendship and neutrality between the two countries, signed in Paris in 1925, and suggested to prepare a new treaty. However, Soviet proposals that followed, aggravated even more the bilateral relations, contributed to the western orientation of Turkey. With approval of Stalin, Georgia and Armenia put in claims on the adjacent parts of Turkish territory. In the course of the diplomatic discussion on the regime of the Black Sea straits between USSR, USA, Great Britain and Turkey, the Soviet party also raised claims unacceptable for the Turks, which resulted in drawing up of a common British-American-Turkish position.

SYNCRETISM OF RELIGIOUS AND MYTHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF PRE-MOSLEM TURKS

I.V. STEBLEVA

The article deals with insufficiently explored problem of various religious and mythological pre-Islam systems which functioned among Turkic peoples of Central Asia,

Southern and Eastern Siberia. From the 6th century Turkic peoples began to form military, political and state unions of tribes. On their territories written texts were created, dealing with shamanism, Buddhism, Manichaeism and Christianity. The adoption of Islam by Turks in Central Asia began in 10th century, but this process was long, and during several centuries Turkic peoples lived in the sphere of other cultural and religious traditions.

Turkic manuscripts available for studying these pre-Islam conceptual systems are written by runic, Manichaean and Uighur scripts. They include special religious texts (prayers, hymns, instructions and norms of religious behaviour) as well as literary works (epitaphs, historical and heroic poems, didactic parables and novels).

A most peculiar feature of these works is the interaction of various religious and mythological traditions. Shamanic texts are influenced by the Manichaean religion (the runic fortune-telling book), Manichaean hymns are created under the influence of Buddhism. The syncretism of Manichaean and Buddhist ideas and notions reaches the level where Mani is identified with Buddha. Manichaeism receives as well an impact of Christianity: in the prayer addressed to "Mani-Angel (and) Buddha" the word equivalent of "angel" means also "apostle." Turkic Christian texts were influenced by shamanism (the ritual formula of space description) and Manichaeism which included in its turn some features of zoroastrianism.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF ABUL-HASAN AL-MAWARDI (NEW TRENDS OF STUDIES)

A.A. IGNATENKO

Works created by this eminent Moslem medieval lawyer, expert on problems of the state, have been studied for a long time by orientalists. Modern islamists interpret the heritage of al-Mawardi, this distinguished theorist of the Islamic state—caliphate, as being purely theocratic concept.

The notion of "concord" (*ulfa*) takes a key place in his concept aimed at giving explanation to the existence and functioning of society. This "concord" is necessary for people to receive "sufficient matter of their life" in the course of "development of the world" (*imara*). Human society is considered by the medieval theorist to be innerly differentiated: "unity in difference" is a precondition of "union" (*i'tilaf*) of people performing various functions in the process of "development of the world" (tillage, handicraft etc.) and therefore needing one another.

Mutual hostility inherent in people by nature requires the existence of power to consolidate this union using the "religion" (*din*). Al-Mawardi reconsiders the notion of "religion" interpreting it as any set of society-organizing norms and rules, including even "dishonesty" (*kufr*) if it

performs the function of uniting people. Norms of the "religion" interpreted in this way are obligatory both for subjects and the sovereign (*malik*), the supreme ruler who is to take measures to ensure the community life.

The article calls in question the authorship of the "Sermon to sovereigns," a well-known treatise whose manuscript is kept in the National Library of Paris, traditionally attributed to al-Mawardi.

ROLE OF SCALES OF TIME AND SPACE IN MODELLING OF HISTORICAL PROCESS

G.S. POMERANTS

Rationality or irrationality of the history depends to a considerable extent on the scale applied to it. This idea was put forward in 1784 by E. Kant who noted the trend to all-world political unification. F. Schlegel, leaning upon the Indian experience, argued that there were no planetary time; each great culture went the way from revelation to rational constructions leading to a loss of creative impulse and to a decline. The model by Kant, in the final analysis, can be traced back to Augustus and Jewish promise of Messiah, and the model by Schlegel—to the Indo-European mythologem of four centuries (golden, silver, copper and iron). These models are not mutually excluding. Total historical movement has a complex inner structure including a number of movements, each of them being evident on a certain scale of articulation of historical time and space. The article distinguishes five scales of the time and the same number of scales for the cultural space. On the super-large scale of Indian mythology, the history in general is an illusion and only eternity is real. On a global large scale accumulated changes (growth of productive forces, of population, differentiation of society and intellect; growing alienation, ecological tension etc.) are first and foremost. A middle global scale discerns wave movements, the "eternal return," the revival of archaic features in the Middle Ages and of the classics in the modern history. In Chinese historiography this is expressed by an alternation of dynasties *in* and *yan*. On a middle local scale the most important are cycles of rise and decline of various cultures. These movements, while they are different enough, can be considered as being rational, easily modelled. They are opposed to explosive movements directed by a charismatic leader (M. Weber) or a group of "passionaries" (L.N. Gumilyov). Here only anthropomorphous scale is possible. There are no reasons to explain Mongolian conquests besides those interlaced in Gengis Khan's personality. It is impossible to foresee what new "passionary" (Hitler, Khomeini) will frustrate all plans of sober-minded people. However, the course of time smoothes away traces of explosions and all the logic of history is restored to its rights.

ROUND TABLE

FUTURE OF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE EAST

Participants: N.A. IVANOV, M.F. VIDYASOVA, L.S. VASILIEV, YU.G. ALEKSANDROV, A.D. DIKARYOV, V.A. YASHKIN, A.V. AKIMOV

This Round Table concerns problems of development of the economic history of the East in the USSR. The article by A.M. Petrov "New Tasks of Ancient Science and Some Materials for Study of Economic History of the East" (1989, No 2) gave rise to the present discussion. The participants put the question: what is the reason of such a lag in the field (history of economy) which was traditionally considered by the marxist science as a priority? A number of solutions is suggested. In the authors' opinion, use of quantitative methods would allow to reject some dogmas which need to be reviewed, e.g. the dogma of the "robbery" of the East as a source of primary capitalist accumulation. The economic backwardness of the East was, first of all, a result of the non-ability of etatist economy to ensure the extended reproduction, and not that of the "colonial robbery."

A negative influence on the East, exerted by the West, was rather that the East actively rejected all western elements, becoming more and more archaic. However, one should not consider that modernization of the eastern economy is inevitably to lead to the death of traditional structures, pre-industrial civilization. The study of economic history of the East would help understanding economic problems of the USSR.

Results of the study of economic history could be applied for forecasting trends in the following fields: global problems, studies of economic growth and analysis of precedents.

UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO) IN ANCIENT CHINA

A.D. DIKARYOV

The process of emancipation of thought in China in 1980s is particularly impressive after the spiritual vacuum of the epoch of "cultural revolution." The thirst of the whole society for knowledge based on the economic reforms, takes in a number of cases the form of unofficial science. An example of such organizations is the scientific societies of UFO fanciers with corresponding periodicals as the revue "Feidie Tansuo" ("Studies of Flying Saucers"). The efforts by Chinese scientists to find in ancient Chinese sources "historical evidences" of UFO existence are of particular interest for Sinologists and experts in science of science. The activities of adherents of this new scientific trend in China demonstrate methodology and tasks of the Chinese historical science in general.

The article considers a number of concrete modern versions of interpretation of historical materials on extraordinary flying phenomena. A number of works criticizing the attempts to place a historical basis under this problem, as a rule, does not dispute the main modern concept of UFO as a product of alien mind.

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Non-Capitalist Development Experience in Central Asia Reviewed

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[Article by M.A. Olimov under the rubric "Socialism in the Orient: A Standard of Non-Capitalist Development?"]

[Text] *The institutions of traditional society in Central Asia that retained a certain allegiance among the masses were a good camouflage for greed during the time of stagnation. Adylov, for example, tried to ground the legality of his "rule" through purely feudal methods, i.e. traced his genealogy back to Tamerlane. The strongly rooted leveling facilitated the preservation of communes of a feudal type. This was not a consequence of the barracks socialism that was propagated by the first utopian socialists Owen, Saint Simon and Fourier and incarnated in our country by the revolutionaries infected with "the infantile disease of leftism" alone. The leveling of barracks socialism is genetically close to feudal leveling and thus easily entered the mass consciousness.*

The question of socialist orientation and the non-capitalist path of development is evoking heated disputes in Oriental studies of late. Debates that were held on this problem at the Oriental Studies Institute and Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a number of articles published in the pages of the journals NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA and MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH-DUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA¹ confirm the undoubted topicality and undeveloped nature of these problems.

The enormous quantity of new materials that are finally accessible to researchers and the opportunity to express oneself openly and honestly and to discuss in the press topics that were closed before have elicited a need to review many of the views on the most difficult problems of the developing countries that have chosen the non-capitalist path of development.

It cannot fail to be seen that the building of socialism in the majority of the socialist-oriented nations was and is being conducted under strong influence from the experience of the USSR, which was propagated by our theoreticians as the base model for the building of socialism and was perceived to be the standard. The model of development of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, which did not undergo the stage of capitalism, was taken as the foundation. Mountains of literature were written in which the non-capitalist development path of the Central Asian republics was supposedly analyzed and recommended as a prototype for the young Third World countries. All of these works, however, suffered from common shortcomings: an enormous

distance from reality, a silence regarding real problems and difficulties and an idealization of the process of building socialism in national regions that had earlier been backward. When distortions of the principles of socialism that were monstrous in scope began to be uncovered in the republics of the Soviet Orient, they forced many social scientists and party workers into a dead end, revealing the complex and equivocal nature of real socialism and ways of building it. All of this dictates the persistent necessity of studying and interpreting the experience of the non-capitalist path of development of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. The need for such research is caused, on the one hand, by the development needs of the republics themselves—since without an objective analysis of the situation, it is impossible to move forward or to correct the multitude of errors and omissions that have now become tangled in a tight knot of almost insoluble problems—and, on the other hand, it is essential for a deepening of our notions of contemporary socialist orientation, since our former ideas, founded on an uncritical approach toward Soviet experience, have not been confirmed by life².

It must be acknowledged that the problems facing the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan today are largely similar to the difficulties that the developing countries in the foreign Orient are experiencing (as relates partly to the countries that have chosen the capitalist development path as well).

Our academics had tried to convince us that the development path of the Oriental republics of the USSR differs radically from the evolution of the socialist-oriented countries of the Orient. Acute conflicts of a national, economic, political and cultural nature have been detected today, however, that are a consequence of the profound processes that we have successfully closed our eyes to over this whole time. Some economists have dared to acknowledge that Tajikistan, for example, is a developing republic with problems that are common to the Third World. They include a high birth rate, i.e. a population explosion, and the problem of a surplus of labor resources that is associated with it, as well as the adaptation of a traditional society founded on the feudal-type rural commune to modern times and the entry of traditional feudal social structures into a modern infrastructure. These issues have been raised in the course of debates that have taken place in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia and have been reflected in the pages of the republic press.

The majority of researchers engaged with these problems are coming to the conclusion that the circle of dangers lying in wait for socialist revolution and the building of a new society is determined principally by the "straightening out" of the historical path, the negative effects of the overall lack of development in the pre-socialist period and the "birthmarks of feudalism." While accepting this point of view in general, I would like to direct the reader's attention to one of its key elements—

the preservation and functioning of traditional society in the republics of the Soviet Orient³.

The task of this article is an attempt to define traditional society as a social phenomenon and to uncover the reasons for its preservation, its forms and functions and the problems associated with its existence.

The effects of traditional society on the life of the indigenous population of Central Asia is enormous. This is explained first and foremost by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population lives in rural areas, and that portion that lives in cities has close ties with the village⁴.

Traditional society is the legacy left to us from feudalism. The rural commune is its foundation. It has, of course, been destroyed to no small extent over the years of Soviet power, but remnants of it have proven to be viable and have, as it were, grown into our reality.

Recall the definition of a rural commune. It is accepted in a broad sense to call any community of people that has taken shape naturally in the course of immediate social practice and was not the result of some willful act a commune. Communes of this type are typical of the whole pre-capitalist period of the history of mankind. They also exist in the contemporary developing countries. We have relics of the commune as well.

Traditional society took shape based on small social groups that were connected by quite close personal relations. Such communities arose most often within the confines of a kishlak or makhalla (a neighborhood that is part of a major kishlak or small city, for example). The existence of the commune within the framework of the makhalla, by the way, has begun to be taken into account by local authorities as well of late. Makhalla committees are being created, and mosques and chaikhans—which usually have the items essential for performing family ceremonies and customs and acquired through funds collected by the inhabitants of the makhalla—are being legalized in the makhallas.

Groups of fellow countrymen could be considered a novel version of such a type of commune. They are especially typical of central Tajikistan and the Vakhsh Valley, where the population consists mostly of resettled people, who strive to settle alongside and maintain close contacts among themselves even if they are territorially scattered.

Relics of traditional society exist in the cities as well. Such as, for example, the cities of northern Tajikistan—Isfara, Kanibadam, Ura-Tyube—where the main body of the residents is individuals of indigenous nationality, as a rule local natives. The urban population is not very mobile. Even students who have completed institutions of higher learning in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities of Russia or in Tashkent and Dushanbe then try to return to their native cities. Very many of the urban residents are associated with agriculture: they have gardens or orchards that are serious—and sometimes the

main—sources of income for the family. The workers at city enterprises and miners in Isfara, for example, take leave at the height of the melon harvest season and work at a kolkhoz or on their own plots occupied with melon gardens. The men are workers and the wives farmers in many families. The traditional domestic institutions are also preserved.

The low mobility and very strong attachment to the land, neighbors and relatives that is characteristic of the indigenous population of the Central Asian republics have facilitated the preservation of elements of the commune to no small extent.

We will try to designate the principal characteristics of traditional society that link it to the feudal-type rural commune.

Traditional society is capable of reproduction, i.e. quite often preserves a tendency to endogamy and provides for its own needs to a much greater extent than, say, the village residents of the Non-Chernozem zone. Even though commodity relations, of course, now permeate the whole daily life of the kishlak, elements of self-sufficiency are preserved.

Such living conditions dictate the significant intensiveness of personal ties. This is fully preserved at the present as well. According to research materials from Uzbekistan⁵, Uzbek workers are oriented toward a larger circle of contacts than Russian ones in their productive lives. They therefore value the opportunity for contacts during work time that is offered by the work being performed considerably less than workers of Russian nationality. Uzbek workers are oriented toward contact with a wider circle of friends than their Russian colleagues outside of production as well as during it⁶. This is also confirmed by the data of other studies. It was revealed in particular that "the time spent on domestic forms of extra-familial contacts out of the total amount of free time of workers of Uzbek nationality" is 2.5 times more than for Russian workers⁷. Contacts among friends are an important function of the contemporary stage of traditional society. It is namely in that sphere that the person receives everything necessary—human warmth, friendship, the understanding of those around him and the support of the collective.

Self-organization exists in traditional society as well. There are always authoritative people in every makhalla or kishlak that regulate and organize the life of the commune. The performance of funerals, weddings, family ceremonies and customs and the settlement of disputes and suits, intra-familial and extra-familial conflicts all fall under their purview. The moral and psychological climate among the given group of people depends on them, and they formulate public opinion.

Neighbors, relatives and all members of a given social group help the person to occupy a definite place in life and to define himself. This function of traditional society has moved to the forefront by virtue of the fact that socialism of a Stalinist type propagated a contempt

for the interests and needs of the individual handed down from feudalism that has yet to be outgrown. I. Ariyevich explains the causes for this situation: "Solid bourgeois-democratic traditions were unable to take shape in Russia, as is well known. They proceeded almost directly from autocratic rule, which was a powerful drag on the capitalist transformation of the economic and psychological image of the country, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, military communism and then, and for a long time, to authoritarian-bureaucratic forms of regulating all of social life. Peoples' conceptions of personal freedom, of their right to independent choice, a respect and regard for their individual features and opinions on the part of state institutions, could not develop fully under those conditions."⁸

Traditional society, being a continuation of the feudal-type rural commune, retained the function of protecting its members that the rural commune performed under the rule of especially harsh and authoritarian feudal lords.

Traditional society strives to satisfy the cultural aspirations of its members as well. The official seats of culture, after all, are either inoperative or else operate in formalistic fashion with regard to the real needs of the person. We turn to a feature in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. "Out of 1,400 clubs in the republic (Tajikistan—M.O.), only 15 are set up in accordance with contemporary requirements. About two hundred are in an emergency state or require immediate repair, and practically all club accommodations are not heated in the winter. Thus is the sham of the figures on the number of circles, the enormous inventories of books and the avidly reading workers revealed."⁹ The staunch preservation of the traditions of evenings of *gap*, *gashtak* and *kharifona* becomes understandable under these conditions. These enjoyable evenings of song, dance, storytelling and the reading of verse are usually arranged sequentially by the members of the given social group in the kishlak or makhalla chaikhana. The *gap* and *gashtak* have begun to be held in private homes in places where the chaikhana have been abolished. The parties for the women were always arranged in private homes.

Finally, all of the communes have the same goal, which consists of preserving traditions, the former conditions of existence, which are depicted as ideal. The commune is always seeking its ideals in an excellent past, in the customs of the ancestors. "The aim of all these communes is the preservation, i.e. reproduction, of the individuals forming up the commune as owners, i.e. their reproduction in the same objective mode of existence, which at the same time establishes the relations of the members of the commune among themselves and thus forms the commune itself."¹⁰ This is entirely applicable to the traditional society of our day as well. The function of self-preservation and the conservation of tradition is moreover playing a larger and larger role to the extent of the increasing tendency toward the standardization of life in the state and the erosion of specific

cultural and national features. Traditional society, protecting against forced standardization, is closed unto itself, as it were, which leads to national fragmentation.

A great deal has changed in our regions, of course, over the 70 years that have passed since the establishment of Soviet power—the republics have advanced far in a material and technical regard and the very mode of production itself has changed, as a consequence of which the class structure of society has changed as well. Despite the radical changes, however, some of the institutions of the commune have been preserved, especially its social, cultural, ritualistic and ideological functions and the multi-level complex of the socialization of the individual.

So what are the reasons for such a staunch preservation of the traditional commune? After all, socialism was called upon in Central Asia—which did not undergo the capitalist stage of development—to destroy the structures inherited from feudalism.

It did not, however, fulfill its role. The socialism that was constructed under the leadership of Stalin was itself a model of a feudal commune. Paternalism, hierarchy, caste and the use of a powerful coercive apparatus were characteristic of it. F. Burlatskiy thus writes in his feature notes describing the political culture of Khrushchev and the then generation of leaders, "This was largely an authoritarian and patriarchal culture gleaned from traditional notions of forms of leadership within the framework of the peasant household. Paternalism, caprice, interference in any matters and relations, the infallibility of the patriarch, intolerance of other opinions—all of this comprised the standard set of age-old notions of power in Russia."¹¹ The paternalistic model of socialism planted by Stalin continued to operate after his death and has survived to the present day.

Hierarchy associated with obedience to duty is characteristic of our society as well. The limited combination of the hierarchy of Stalinist socialism with the hierarchies of the older feudal system was moreover a specific feature of the Central Asian republics.

The multi-cultural economy in Tajikistan furthermore fostered the preservation of a feudal structure in the same way as in the other cotton-growing republics. Cotton is 16 times less profitable than a garden, according to the calculations of economists¹², and wages in cotton growing are ludicrously low. Whence the predominantly female and child labor in cotton farming. The principal family income is obtained from the subsidiary plot and cottage industries (where possible). The head of a family, with the 60-70 rubles a month obtained from cultivating cotton, cannot feed his family and is forced to seek a job for himself with guaranteed wages. Men have thus filled the positions of accountants, watchmen, tellers, chaikhana workers and cooks. Those who cannot get a job on a kolkhoz or a sovkhoz cultivate subsidiary plots and sell their produce on the market,

sending their wives and children to the cotton plantations in their place. They are compelled to do this, since the executives of the kolkhozes always have a means of forcing people to work in cotton: the threat of taking away the subsidiary plot—which is often the sole source of family income—exists here, as does the threat of banning on the breeding of livestock etc. Work on the kolkhoz is thus seen as corvée—and here we have an analogy to feudal systems of economic operation.

The forcibly imposed leveling of wages has also facilitated the preservation of the feudal-type commune. This is not the legacy of the barracks socialism that was propagated by the first utopian socialists Owen, Saint Simon and Fourier and implemented in our country by the revolutionaries infected with the "infantile disease of leftism" alone. The leveling of barracks socialism is genetically close to feudal leveling, and thus easily entered the mass consciousness. The feudal commune, after all, also strove to equalize the income of its members.

The existence of traditional society based on the relics of the rural commune creates a multitude of problems. One of the most serious is the adaptation of the peasants, the principal carriers of traditional consciousness, in the city. The mechanism of socialization in traditional society, including education, was founded on a system of bans and constraints implemented by the commune itself. Feudalism had no vested interest in individuality or individual morality. Only the Renaissance raised the issue of the value of initiative and active individuality and prepared the soil for a new understanding of morality and a new mechanism for cultivating it. Under capitalism, on the one hand, which has a vested interest in active individuality and, at the same time, the co-existence of these individualities, and on the other hand, being the result of the activity of people with initiative, the problem of the moral law within the person arose acutely. Each individual should observe moral law regardless of where and among whom he is, obeying inner compulsion. This differs radically from morals of a feudal type thrust on them from without, i.e. by the collective. The representative of a traditional society thus proves to be in a very grave position when he changes environment. Rural youth, arriving in the city, no longer feel the pressures of traditional society, lose their points of reference and some of them deteriorate. It seems that the fall in morality that is typical of the whole country in general is occurring in the republics of Central Asia largely due to the absence of a mechanism for adaptation of the bearers of traditional consciousness. The seriousness of the problem is being felt in many countries, and state programs for the adaptation of the *adivasi* (tribes) exist in India, for example.

The difficulty of adaptation must necessarily be taken into account in planning urbanization or resettlement as well. Even simple resettlement without a radical change in the environment, after all, breaks up the prevailing models of economic operation, daily life and ties with nature and inflicts psychological trauma on people.

In the semi-forced resettlement of the Yagnobi people from the mountains to the valleys for the purpose of assimilating the virgin lands, some of them were unable to adapt to the new living conditions and perished, while others almost lost their language and customs. Only that very small portion of the Yagnobi that fled back to their native places were able to preserve their native culture¹³.

The concept of the redistribution of surplus labor resources via resettlement from Central Asia to Russia of no fewer than seven million people (450,000 a year)¹⁴ seems profoundly erroneous in light of this experience.

The issue of the spheres of employment of the indigenous population, especially the rural one—i.e. the principal bearers of traditional consciousness—also belongs to this circle of problems. The authors of the article in *KOMMUNIST* that was mentioned addressed this burning question: "Even apropos of the backward regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, one cannot fail to take into account the thousand-year traditions of craft labor, specialization of peasant farms in the cultivation of commodity cotton or fruit, the presence of traditional livestock breeding in nomadic form and other realities of economic life. There was almost no tradition of industrial labor in Central Asia or Kazakhstan, of course, and its bearer—the working class—was effectively lacking. It was namely for that reason that it was essential to address the extant forms of labor with particular attention and to create the preconditions for industrialization on the basis of them with the aid of cooperation. This process possibly seemed too prolonged at the time. Today's experience shows that this could be the shortest and most effective route of development of relations from patriarchal to contemporary. Then perhaps the very same tasks as at the 12th RKP(b) Congress—drawing the indigenous population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan into industrial production, and the local women into social labor—would not have still been there in the latest party documents."¹⁵

Even though traditional society has been preserved to the present day in the republics, we are adopting the guise that it has not. Our press is declaring the homogeneity of classes and segments and ignoring the difference, for example, between the hereditary proletariat and yesterday's peasant—the bearer of age-old ideals and values.

It is not surprising that the needs of traditional society are being ignored as well. Whereas some funds are allocated for the development of opera and symphonic music, there are no funds for national music. That is why a situation unique to the Soviet Union has taken shape in the republics of Central Asia, and Tajikistan in particular, where the musical-drama theaters are engaged principally with concert activity, thereby satisfying the spiritual aspirations of the rural residents to a certain extent. The professional performers of traditional Tajik music are forced to maintain themselves by indulging the not always discriminating tastes of the listeners paying for the presentations; their skill level drops as a result. A

folklore collective was formed just two years ago in a republic with a very rich folklore.

All of this has led to the sharp rejection by the indigenous population of European types of art imposed forcibly from above. In Tajikistan, for example, as in the other republics of Central Asia, no small efforts and funds are expended on the development of choral singing. The presentations of choruses are obligatorily included in the program for amateur groups in the Buston republic competitions of national creativity, even though it is well known that Tajik music—both the popular and the traditional professional—are monodic (solo). Each time the regional authorities, out of considerations of prestige and a falsely understood internationalism, present teams of choruses scraped together by visiting choirmasters, for whom multiple-voice music is profoundly alien, anyway. It must be said that choral singing has thus not taken hold in the republic.

Traditional society finds its ethical and aesthetic ideals only in the Indian cinema, albeit a surrogate but meeting its own needs. We will dwell on this in a little more detail. Today many are surprised and troubled by the popularity of the openly commercial and plain Indian films. This was discussed at a conference of film critics from Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Dushanbe (September 1988). It was painful to hear that the reason for the especial popularity of Indian melodramas was found in the low cultural level of the public. It seems that the reason for the success is the fact that the Indian commercial cinema is created for a specific viewer with patriarchal values and principles. Notwithstanding the outwardly contemporary attributes of the Indian films, they glorify traditional virtues such as obedience to elders, faith and devotion to parents, be they what they may, while traditionally diminishing the role of women in family and society. Only a respectable (by traditional measures) heroine can come to a happy ending. Such are the principles of traditional society. Add to that a melodramatic plot (melodrama, after all, is a democratic and popular form of art) and a combination of action with music and dance that is close to that of the popular Tajik theater.

The particular complexity of the contemporary state of traditional society consists of the fact that the bearers of petty-bourgeois psychology armed themselves with some of its social and cultural institutions. It is namely for that reason that the opinion took shape that feudal-*bai* remnants flourished during the years of stagnation while parochialism, protectionism and the oppression of women are at the same time essentially the fruits of our time cloaked in feudal dress. The institutions of traditional society, which have retained a certain attraction for the masses, became a good camouflage for greed during stagnation. Adylov, for example, tried to substantiate the legitimacy of his "rule" using purely feudal means, i.e. traced his own genealogy back to Tamerlane. The almost-forgotten and newly revived practice of *kalym* [bride-money] also seems to be of an almost feudal nature. This is confirmed by the fact that the

paying of *kalym* is higher in places where the shadow economy is more strongly developed, while the traditional commune is in the process of disintegration.

The shadow economy thus gives birth to the corresponding consciousness—in its essence a bourgeois, not a feudal, one. It is evidently very important to distinguish between traditional society and those who mimic it, trying to contrive behind it.

The era of stagnation legitimized the co-existence of traditional society and its ideals, morals and values with the official ideology. The dual morals of the upper reaches was reflected in the dual morals of the lower reaches. Some official realities moreover entered traditional consciousness—either by similarity or by analogy. The graduation certificate, for example, became approximately the same part of the bride's dowry as a rug or chest. Whence the statistical data, pleasing to the eye, on the number of girls that have obtained secondary education, while at the same time these girls themselves are often functionally illiterate, since both their parents and their teachers perceive their education to be a formality, as a means of receiving the *kogaz*—the paper that is an essential condition for marriage. That is partly why schooling is so superficial in the kishlak. There exist two truths and two types of knowledge from the very beginning for the pupil—that which he receives at home, and that which he receives at school. Since the children see that the teacher is guided basically by the principles of traditional society in everyday life rather than those that they proclaim in the lessons, they do not believe in school knowledge very much. This split begins in childhood, conditioning the firm and non-contradictory nature of the co-existence of official and traditional ideology. This specific feature of mass consciousness in the republics of Central Asia is making the process of restructuring especially difficult, since individuals able to defend their own opinion are essential to the success of restructuring.

The problem of cultivating a free and thinking individual is very acute under the conditions of traditional society, since a tendency to level its members is characteristic of the feudal-type rural commune that gave rise to him. Traditional society strives to suppress brilliant individuality or dissimilarity in others. Until recently our whole society and system of pre-school, elementary and higher education prosecuted the same aim, and this was in step with traditional society. Today the scarcity of individuality that is typical of the whole union is being especially felt in the Central Asian republics.

The process of the destruction of traditional society began long ago and is being actively continued today. As was stated above, however, the chief aim of the commune, being the foundation of traditional society, is the reproduction of traditions; in other words, traditional society is trying to defend itself. It seems that the causes of some still not quite understood phenomena (the appearance of Islamic fundamentalists, for example) are rooted in this.

So the preservation of the feudal legacy, and especially traditional society based on the rural commune, conditions the particular complexity of the building of socialism in the republics of the Soviet Orient. The chief task on this path, as A.V. Kiva writes, "consists of revealing the minimum 'work for capitalism' (as for all of the prior formations) that should be done in a certain sequence in the non-capitalist stage of development without which the building of socialism will inevitably be accompanied by serious negative consequences."¹⁶

It is asserted in the majority of the features devoted to the paths of socialist development that it is essential to be rid of the causes that engendered the bureaucratic-command system of management and its diverse manifestations in the spheres of ideology, economics and culture, i.e. the "birthmarks of feudalism." The advance toward socialism, according to the apt observation of A. Tsipko, will thus "be conceived as a process of breaking alien portions off of the socialism that is being born. Both the defenders and the critics of Stalinism assume in particular that socialism is the elimination of the prior multi-institutionality and, first and foremost, the elimination of small-scale peasant production; that it is impossible to achieve the level of planning essential to socialism without dictate, without the subordination of the whole economic life of the country to the center; that the danger of petty-bourgeois disintegration can be countered only via the proletarianization of society..."¹⁷

But we pose this question: by what means can the stereotypes of feudal consciousness in the minds of tens—if not hundreds—of thousands of people possibly be broken in a short time, and feudal structures that have proven their viability over the course of many centuries dissolved? The path of adaptation rather than destruction seems more promising for traditional society from this point of view. The experience of Japan, China and India, which have made extremely widespread use of traditional structures, should clearly be studied very attentively.

The enormous growth in industrial production based on contemporary technology and the transition of agriculture onto the path of intensification of course brings about a need for educated and modern-thinking workers with initiative. Becoming such workers is a wholly achievable goal for the representatives of traditional society. They possess a number of valuable traits—love of work, patience, sociability and firm moral principles. Tajik schoolchildren, according to the assertions of the well-known Estonian sociologist Professor Tiitma, have a much more realistic attitude toward themselves and their future career than Russian or Estonian schoolchildren, who have exaggerated demands toward life and an unsuitable conception of themselves¹⁸.

Peoples must be helped not to lose the excellent qualities that were devised by the generations of their fathers and grandfathers, adapt themselves toward rapidly changing life and create a mechanism of adaptation. Japanese researcher Masanori Moritani notes that the study of the

labor traditions of peoples becomes "an incentive for the development... of their own specific features and strong qualities, to a certain, albeit small, extent making a contribution to their technological growth."¹⁹

The traditional labor skills and habits of the population must be taken into account when locating industrial facilities. Electronics and computer production, requiring the skills of precise and painstaking work, could probably be developed successfully, for example, in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with their many-centuries-old traditions of crafts. The rejection of the single-crop growing of cotton and the widespread development of leasing seem to be other ways of converting traditional society into a new quality. Only independence can incite the individual in a person and force him to think, decide and act.

A profound respect for the spiritual and cultural values and traditions of traditional society are, of course, a fundamental condition for its adaptation to modern times. This requires the fullest possible satisfaction of its cultural aspirations and the development of traditional arts and crafts.

A respect for Islam is furthermore essential, as it is very difficult to extract religion from the whole set of traditional consciousness.

Successes in contemporary development can be achieved not by setting traditional society off against modern times, but rather making it parallel with its evolution. In the words of Academician L.I. Abalkin, "we have for decades emphasized our dissimilarity to all others, including prior generations, at best acknowledging just elements of material culture. Yes, of course, engineering, agriculture, construction experience—alien and past—was not repudiated, but only now are we actually realizing the simple fact that we are first and foremost people that belong to a single unified and unique civilization, and we are divided into classes, nations, races and historical degrees of development only within that framework. Socialism can therefore be a motive force only by absorbing all that is best that mankind has accumulated, not only in material culture, but also in economic structures, democratic traditions and the spiritual sphere."²⁰

Footnotes

1. See, for example: NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1988, No 6, pp 49-58; 1989, No 1, pp 42-53; No 2, pp 25-36; No 3, pp 27-37; AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1987, No 8, pp 26-33; No 10, pp 22-26; MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA. 1987, No 5, pp 70-81; No 11, pp 67-77.

2. See: A.V. Kiva. Socialist Orientation: Theory and Reality.—NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. 1988, No 6, p 53. Idem., Socialist Orientation: Theoretical Potential of the Concept and Practical Realities.—MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNAYA OTNOSHENIYA. 1988, No 11, p 77.

3. This issue was considered in the article using the example of Tajikistan and, partly, Uzbekistan.

4. In Tajikistan, for example, 66 percent of the population lives in rural areas (compare for the country overall: 35.2 percent).

5. Insofar as sociological research has not been conducted on these problems in Tajikistan, I am relying on data from research in Uzbekistan, considering that similar processes are transpiring in that republic as well. As for the workers as the subject of research, it cannot fail to be taken into account that Uzbek workers, like Tajiks, are principally yesterday's peasants and, consequently, preserve the basic traits of traditional consciousness.

6. See: L.S. Perepelkin. The Question of Ethnocultural Factors of Labor Activity of the Worker in Contemporary Industry.—SOV. ETNOGRAFIYA, 1987, No 2, p 87.

7. T.S. Saidbayev. "Islam i obshchestvo. Opyt istoriko-sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya" [Islam and Society. Experience of Historical Sociological Research]. Moscow, 1984, p 231.

8. I. Ariyevich. Lessons Unlearned.—NOVOYE VREMYA. 1988, No 39, p 24.

9. L. Makhkamov. Right to a Leader's Mandate.—SOV. KULTURA. 21 Nov 88.

10. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works. Vol. 46, Part I, p 483.

11. F. Burlatskiy. After Stalin.—NOVYY MIR, 1988, No 10, p 196.

12. See: V. Koroteyeva, L. Perepelkin, O. Shkaratan. From Bureaucratic Centralism to the Economic Integration of Sovereign Republics.—KOMMUNIST. 1988, No 15, p 25.

13. See the documentary film "Motiv" on this (Tajik-film, director M. Yusupova, 1987).

14. D.I. Zyuzin. Versions of Socio-Economic Development of the Central Asian Region.—SOTSIOL. ISSLED. 1986, No 4, p 21.

15. V. Koroteyeva, L. Perepelkin, O. Shkaratan. Op. cit., pp 24-25.

16. A.V. Kiva. Socialist Orientation: Theoretical Potential of the Concept and Practical Realities, p 77.

17. A. Tsipko. Origins of Stalinism.—NAUKA I ZHIZN. 1988, No 12, p 40.

18. See the report of Professor Tiytma at the All-Union Sociological Conference of 1986 in Dushanbe.

19. M. Moritani. "Sovremennaya tekhnologiya i ekonomicheskoye razvitiye Yaponii" [Modern Technology and the Economic Development of Japan]. Moscow, 1986, p 31.

20. L.I. Abalkin and P. Volin. Medicine for the Economy.—LITER. GAZ. 1988, No 4, p 10.

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Effects of Socialist, Capitalist Orientation in Africa Compared

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[Article by Yu.V. Potemkin under the rubric "Socialist Orientation: Theory and Reality - Africa: Different Points of Reference and Common Problems. Socio-Economic Policy in Countries with Alternative Orientations"]

[Text] *The post-colonial period in the history of the Afro-Asian countries has been marked by diverse processes of differentiation, including socio-political. One manifestation of the latter is the capitalist or socialist orientation of social development. Both are of a superstructure nature of the form of realization of alternative development created by the existence of two world social systems. Capitalist orientation consists of stimulating and regulating by state authorities of the essentially spontaneous development of the capitalism that was begun in the colonial era. Socialist orientation is a much more complicated social phenomenon. It is the attempts (and the corresponding steps) of the political leadership to impart to the socio-economic process a nature that negates the "obligation" of movement from pre-capitalist and early-capitalist forms of production toward capitalist ones. The development of productive forces and productive relations is directed in such a way that the objective conditions for the emergence of the socialist mode of production in the future gradually take shape.*

The two directions of development stand out in the sharpest relief in Africa. Here is where the majority of the socialist-oriented nations are. Here is where the corresponding "polar" manifestations of political and ideological structures—the spheres in which the watershed between the two directions is particularly noticeable—are also visible. (The differences between them, it is true, are being muffled somewhat in places where the ruling groups, taking into account the widespread sentiments of social dissatisfaction, are concealing their actual orientation toward capitalism with "socialist" rhetoric.)

The general conditions of the choice of socialist-oriented development and its substance, experience in pursuing it and the causes for the instability and digression of the majority of the so-called "first-generation" countries from the course taken earlier have been analyzed in many works by Soviet researchers. Critical attitudes toward it have grown considerably stronger to a certain extent under the influence of such digressions, as well as—and especially—in view of the increased economic

difficulties experienced by the countries of this orientation in recent years. But while criticizing, and quite justly, dogmatic notions divorced from reality (it is enough to recall the "ironclad" sets of "criteria" of socialist orientation), some authors have essentially come to reject the very possibility of pursuing a socialist-oriented course. It seems that today's "skepticism" in relation to this course is occurring largely due to earlier overestimations of its "missions" and the too-great "demands" made of it, the unjustified exaggeration of the extent of the "pre-socialist" stage in which the socialist choice is proclaimed, and even the actual equation of the substance of that stage with the building of socialism.

The differences between the two approaches are moreover inordinately exaggerated in approaching the problem. The boundary between them, quite clear-cut in the sphere of political ideology, is much less noticeable in the socio-economic realm. Recall the idea of V.I. Lenin that at a certain stage *"one and the same road leads..."* the backward economy *"through one and the same intermediate station"* toward both socialism and capitalism¹. This is valid in view of the actually identical nature of the basic tasks in overcoming backwardness. They consist overall of the development of productive forces—both material and human—in creating the potential for overcoming them.

This circumstance inevitably reduces the socio-economic aspect of the alternative courses of social development to the non-fundamental and immaterial differences in the correlation of aims and methods of economic and social policy employed in the countries of both orientations. Industry must be developed in the one and the other, for example. This is done using state and private entrepreneurship—under differing political definitions of their roles, of course, but with an essentially analogous economic substance and with a correlation between them determined in each case with a regard for many specific conditions: the latter could make the predominance of state entrepreneurship over private—quite recently felt to be one of the indispensable criteria of non-capitalist development—completely non-obligatory. Steps to raise agricultural production are acutely necessary in both the one and the other. The state acts as the initiator for pursuing them, and the set of these measures is currently in fact identical under any orientation (the forced creation of state and cooperative sectors in agriculture that was pursued from the very beginning in some socialist-oriented countries was replaced with a more realistic policy in the agrarian sphere after the premature and economically untimely "collectivization" of production proved its ineffectiveness)². It is necessary to augment the social infrastructure, homogeneous in its basic elements, in both places etc. The difference in orientation is as a result usually manifested not in priorities and not in the intensiveness of specific steps for solving existing problems (the degree of intensiveness depends more on financial, technical and economic capabilities than on

the direction selected), but rather in the ideological coloring of the approaches to them.

This is testified to in particular by a survey of the situation on the continent and the socio-economic policy of the African nations of both orientations in aspects directly affecting the vital interests of the popular masses, the human component of productive forces, defined by V.I. Lenin as the "first productive force." The issue is the employment of the population, income and consumption, the development of education and health care.

I.

The situation in Africa after the elimination of colonialism was exceedingly complex and contradictory. The attainment of state sovereignty by the former colonies, on the one hand, expanded the opportunities for resolving acute social problems; these opportunities, on the other hand, were restricted in view of the extremely low level of productive forces, economic backwardness and dependence on the developed capitalist nations. The mistakes of the local governments also played no small role in a number of cases. Incorrect social policies in the majority of the countries on the continent in the last decade, as was noted at the international conference "The Human Factor in the Restoration and Development of the African Economy" organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and held in Khartoum in March 1988, have led to a sharp drop in real incomes of the population, growth in unemployment, reductions in access to education and health care and increases in infant mortality. Hunger and regional conflicts have entailed a significant increase in refugees and displaced persons. The overall level of the social safety net for the population has dropped appreciably.

It would be incorrect to suppose that these assertions relate just to the countries oriented toward capitalism. It should not be lost from view at the same time that the states with progressive regimes—Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia—have been deprived of normal conditions over the course of the whole period of development along the path of socialist orientation. The migrations of large bodies of people caused by the climate of war has had a disorganizing effect on the life of society. The enormous forced expenditures on defense have reduced substantially the possibilities for financing the economy and the social sphere. Angolan imports in 1985, according to official data, consisted of more than half military matériel. Defense spending in Ethiopia totals about 44 percent of current budget expenses in 1989, and has increased by almost 11 percent since 1988. Four large factories, hospitals or a university could be equipped, for example, or a railroad built across the whole country, for the funds swallowed up by war over a year, in the words of the president of Ethiopia.

It is understandable how difficult the solution of urgent problems is under such political conditions. One of those problems is providing employment for the able-bodied

population. The following data testify to its acuity in Africa. Out of the 33 million people by which the able-bodied population of the continent increased in the 1970s, some 15 million, according to ECA estimates, were unable to find paying work. Unemployment is an average of roughly 20 percent of the workforce in the cities. The number of those wholly unemployed was estimated at 13.3 million people at the beginning of the 1980s (33 percent more than in 1975), and a clear trend toward further growth in their numbers exists—to almost 45 million in the first decade of the 21st century, according to ECA forecasts³.

Unemployment is growing in practically all of the countries of the continent regardless of the direction of their social development. In Zimbabwe, the "youngest" of the socialist-oriented states and possessing relatively high economic potential, it increased from 12 to approximately 18 percent of the able-bodied population in 1984-87⁴. That figure is almost as high in Algeria. The growth in unemployment is a consequence of the ever growing gap between the size of the workforce and the demand for it as determined by the rate of economic development. The number of people coming to

the market from the educational system in particular is growing. These are chiefly adolescents who have completed elementary school and have no professional training. They comprise, according to ECA estimates, some 22 percent of all new manpower across Africa overall, and with the prevailing trends the share of them could increase to 41 percent in the first decade of the next century⁵.

Underemployment exists in considerable dimensions alongside the mass of open unemployment both in the cities and, especially, in rural areas. It encompassed roughly 40 percent of the workforce in the villages at the beginning of the 1980s, according to ECA data, and has increased an average of 4.2 percent a year⁶. The overall picture is even more depressing when allowing for hidden unemployment in the urban "informal" sector.

The unemployment of a significant portion of the able-bodied population, a consequence and component of economic backwardness, is aggravated by the continuing population explosion that began in the second half of the 20th century as the result of the fight against epidemic diseases, reductions in infant mortality and the preservation of a high birth rate (see table).

Demographic Dynamics in Africa, 1960-2000 (millions of people) %

Regions	1960	%	1980	%	2000	%
All of Africa	274.3	100	466.8	100	806.7	100
Including:						
North (7 countries)	65.7	24.0	107.9	23.1	181.3	22.5
Sub-Saharan (43 countries)	190.4	69.4	326.7	70.0	569.2	70.5
Southern (5 countries)	18.2	6.6	32.2	6.9	56.2	7.0

Sources: Labour Force Estimates and Projections 1950-2000. ILO, Geneva, 1977; ECA. Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa. 1980-1981. Tripoli, 1982; Annex X.

The population of the continent increased by more than 70 percent over the 1960s and 1970s and by the end of the century will grow, according to forecasts, by roughly another 73 percent. It will thus have almost tripled over 40 years. The pressure on the labor market is constantly increasing therein by virtue of the age patterns (children under 15 comprised 45 percent of the population at the beginning of the 1980s), and this trend will be preserved in the future as well, although the able-bodied population (from 15 to 64 years old) is increasing somewhat more slowly than the population overall. This pressure is especially palpable in the cities, to which the most dynamic portion of the village inhabitants is being constantly driven by poverty and hopelessness. This migration determines the rapid growth rate of the urban population. Over two decades (from 1960 through 1980) its proportionate share rose from 18.1 to 28.6 percent across the whole continent, including from 29.7 to 47.7 percent in North Africa, 11.8 to 21.7 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and from 41.7 to 46.5 percent in southern Africa. These indicators will be 42.7, 60.3, 35.6 and 57.9 percent respectively by the year 2000, according to expert forecasts⁷.

Other factors besides demographic and migrational ones are operating as well that are connected in one way or

another with the problem of employment. The necessity of achieving a technical level of social production, or at least individual sectors of it, that would ensure growth in labor productivity and, consequently, economic and social progress is undoubtedly essential, particularly with the prevailing requirements for a sharp increase in jobs. The need for a skilled workforce for the technologically more developed spheres of social production compared to the traditional sector is just as obvious.

All of this requires a comprehensive approach to the problem and well-thought-out and considered solutions in demographic policy, be it what relates to the transformations in the village that would slow the migration of the rural population to the cities, the issue of the type and rate of industrial development, the combination of capital- and labor-intensive types of production or the cause of developing the educational system. It is also clear that variations of the solutions for all these issues in each country depends not only on the socio-political orientation of the ruling forces, but the initial level of economic development and a whole series of conditions—natural, resource, technical and others—as well.

II.

Socialist orientation in and of itself does not provide the optimal correlation of the efforts of the state in the economic and social spheres of development and does not rule out the possibility of this or that "distortion" in its policies. The Algerian experience of the forced creation of exceedingly capital-intensive sectors of heavy industry in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, is well known. Views of the "industrializing industry" as the most reliable means of economic modernization, which would then entail social modernization, predominated among the country's leaders at the time. Algeria, thanks to directing the lion's share of the investment potential provided by the export of raw hydrocarbons to high-technology types of production (about half of the capital investment went to the oil and gas sector therein), was transformed into one of the most industrially developed countries of Africa. But the low economic efficiency of the new types of production was revealed quite quickly, and a number of imbalances arose and were aggravated. This was caused—along with other reasons—by the lag of agriculture and category II in general, brought about largely by the preservation of the narrowness of the domestic market, shortages of skilled manpower at the enterprises of the state sector and their oversaturation (frequently 50-100 percent of the planned standards) with unskilled workers and the unprepared nature of the infrastructure⁸.

The implementation of major projects at a high technical level in Algeria was undoubtedly facilitated by the creation of an industrial base for economic progress. The prolonged concentration of principal efforts in that sphere, however, gave rise to serious contradictions and to a certain extent victimized many of the social aspects of development. This caused the necessity of correcting the policy at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. Capital investment in agriculture and the economic and social infrastructure (including housing construction) was increased in particular while the proportionate share of capital-intensive projects was reduced, and spending grew on education, health care and social security.

The necessity of a comprehensive approach to solving economic and social problems exists in all countries regardless of the level of their development and their orientation. A more progressive nature for the latter, all other conditions being equal, should in principle be manifested in the greater perceptiveness of the political leadership to "signals" on the appearance of dangerous imbalances in the socio-economic sphere and a determination to take the necessary steps to normalize the situation with a regard for the interests of the working masses and the poorer segments of the population. It can scarcely be asserted, however, that socialist-oriented states are always and without fail superior in that regard to countries of alternative directions. The point is that the opportunities for reacting effectively to "anomalies" that arise are far from always suited to the intentions that are defined by the progressive nature of socio-political

policy (one cannot forget instances of the substantial distortion of the policies of the leaders by bourgeois and corrupt elements).

One of the most important constituent elements of the process of overcoming backwardness that directly affects the status of the greater portion of the population is transformations in agriculture. The scale and rate of migration to the cities—and, consequently, the dynamics of unemployment—depend on the nature of them in particular. The reduction of that migration to a minimum (attempts to "abolish" it legally produce no results, as a rule) would signify a narrowing of the main channel of growth in urban unemployment. Practice at the same time testifies to the necessity of a certain caution and careful preparation in these transformations, that they not entail reductions in the already low level of economic efficiency in agriculture.

The task of increasing agricultural production has taken on especial acuity in recent years in connection with the sharp worsening of the food situation on the continent. The ascent of the agrarian sphere is considered a key factor in surmounting the crisis situation and ensuring steady and balanced economic growth in the national plans of Algeria, Angola, the Congo and other socialist-oriented countries. Investment policy has been reconsidered for that purpose, and the amount of capital investment in agriculture has been increased substantially. Real corrections have also been made to agrarian policy itself. The essence of the changes consists of the rejection of an expansion of the state sector, a rise in its profitability, a more realistic approach to production cooperation and the broader utilization of the potential of the private sector. The changes in agrarian policy, judging by the statements of the leading figures of the countries cited, do not signify a review of the socialist-oriented strategy of development, but rather an attempt to find ways and means that would allow them to achieve the fastest possible ascent of agriculture.

Industry has an important role in the development of modern forms of hiring, organizing and utilizing labor resources. Growth in it—at fading rates, true—is being observed in the majority of the African countries over the whole period of independence. The 1980s were declared the decade of industrial development in Africa. Employment in that sphere of production also increased, but the trend toward capital-intensiveness in new industrial enterprises has narrowed the opportunities for hiring manpower. According to ECA data relating to the 43 countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the share of the able-bodied population employed in industry increased from 7.5 to 13.4 percent over the 1960s and 1970s, significantly less than employment in the services sphere, which increased from 12.5 to 17.6 percent over that same period (the share of agriculture in the sector structure of the economically active population was reduced from 80 to 69 percent, although the size of that portion of those employed grew by almost 27 percent)⁹.

The data for the majority of the socialist-oriented countries, with the exception of the Congo, where more substantial changes have occurred, are close to these figures.

The significance of the non-agricultural sphere, including the "informal" sector, is thereby increasing in the sector structure of employment. Here small business, not requiring significant capital investment and a highly skilled workforce, is creating a significant and exceedingly elastic demand for manpower. The opportunities for growth in employment in the contemporary sector are not great as a consequence of the trend toward a rise in the capital-intensiveness of enterprises. Just a few countries in Africa were able to increase employment in the urban contemporary sector by 5 percent a year in the 1960s and 1970s, while an increase of roughly 13 percent, according to ECA estimates, was needed in order to absorb the influx of manpower, and even more to reduce existing unemployment. The labor-absorbing potential of the "informal" sector could not be ignored by the governments of the African countries under those conditions.

The policy of the government of Zimbabwe, where work by hire ("organized" employment) encompassed only 25 percent of the able-bodied population in 1985, is deserving of attention in this regard. The first 5-year plan of development (1986-1990) envisages incentives for individual labor activity in the "informal" sector along with increases in "organized" employment and assistance to the cooperative movement in all sectors of the economy. The organization of professional training for those desiring it so that those who receive it can conduct their "affairs" more efficiently, and even expand them with possible financial support on the part of the state¹⁰, is being planned there for that purpose.

Utilization of the potential of the "informal" sector has no little significance for expanding employment (frequently, true, it is not full employment) and for intrinsically economic development. The discussion, of

course, does not concern transforming small-scale production into the principal sphere for the growth in productive forces: that would lead to stagnation and the preservation of backwardness, since it would in fact "cut off" the economy from scientific and technical progress. An efficient policy on this issue obviously consists of finding the optimal combinations of small- and large-scale capital, traditional and contemporary forms of it and labor- and capital-intensive technologies for the conditions of each country (regardless of its socio-political orientation).

The evolution of the positions of the African countries in the issue of limiting the growth rates of the population are also connected with the problem of employment. The earlier negative attitude of the majority of the states toward restraining that growth had changed by the 1980s. Limiting the birth rate and planning families are being currently recognized more and more as a means of lessening economic difficulties. Various steps of an informational-propaganda and educational nature are being taken more and more in this direction.

Increases in the dimensions of unemployment are one of the factors, combined with the political conditions, that determine the dynamic of the standard of living and income patterns for the population of the African countries. The paucity or absence of statistical data does not permit the clear-cut delineation of those patterns in their social-class aspects. A number of indirect indicators, however, testify to the deepening property inequality that is having a powerful effect on the social climate. This process is proceeding against a background of declines in the levels of income and consumption (the average per-capita income in Africa, according to data of the International Labor Office, is currently lower than it was in 1960). The dimensions of poverty in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa in the last quarter of the 20th century looks or will look as follows, according to prevailing estimates¹¹:

%					
Years	Total population, millions	Population without adequate nourishment, millions	Share of total population, percent	Population with insufficient coverage of basic needs*, millions	Share of total population, percent
1974	303	116	38.3	205	67.6
1982	370	124	33.5	200	54.1
1987	420	131	31.2	221	52.6
2000	583**	147	25.2	215	36.9

*—Individuals not having a minimum of housing, medical care, education and nourishment. **—This number differs somewhat from the ILO forecast cited above.

The dimensions of poverty in that part of the continent, as we see, while declining relative to the overall size of the population, are growing in absolute terms. Experts of the World Bank feel that per-capita income there fell 25 percent over the 1980s alone. The increasing economic difficulties in the majority of the African countries is making any rise whatsoever in the

standard of living for the masses unrealistic in the near future. The situation is no better from the point of view of social justice. Experts from the ECA feel that the aggregate income of the upper 20 percent of the population was four times that of the income of the poorest 40 percent by the beginning of the 1980s for Africa overall¹².

The magnitude of the gap in incomes is one of a few indicators of the palpable difference between the countries of alternative orientations in the socio-economic realm. The principles of social justice and the priority significance of the interests of the workers that are proclaimed in the socialist-oriented states assumes a more consistent policy of regulating incomes through the mechanisms of prices, wages, taxation and other channels than in other countries. Indirect evidence of this, in light of the lack of the corresponding statistical data, could be the ratio of average income in the city and the village in particular. The gap between them is considerably smaller in the socialist-oriented countries than in the states of capitalist development. It was 1.1 in Benin at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, for example, versus 5.1 in Nigeria; 1.4 in Tanzania versus 4.1 in Liberia; 3.5 in the Congo versus 7.7 in Senegal etc.¹³

One cannot, of course, absolutize this situation. Much depends on the specific conditions associated with socio-economic policy with an overall orientation of development toward a socialist future. Much is also determined by the requirements for the utmost ascent of productive forces as the chief strategic mission of today's stage. These requirements make it impossible, the more so ruinous, under the conditions, say, of Zimbabwe—a country whose relative economic stability is founded to a considerable extent on the capital and competence of the white settlers—to pursue a policy of social justice "at any price" or some "all-out offensive" against imperialism, the necessity for which is sometimes mentioned by the radically inclined representatives of the national intelligentsia¹⁴.

III.

Other segments of social policy—education and health care—are also closely connected with the problem of employment. Their rapid development during the period of independence has not only had self-sufficing significance, but has also created no small demand for personnel at various levels of professional training—from unskilled manpower to degreed specialists. The growth rate of employment in these spheres has considerably surpassed the overall growth rates in many countries.

As for what relates to education, the aforementioned link is not limited to this. The necessity of organizing the educational system in a way that would not copy Western structures, but would rather proceed from local conditions to the maximum extent, has taken on more and more acuity with the passage of time. The receipt of certain labor skills and professional training with a regard for the needs of the economy, which would markedly ease their post-schooling job placement, has especially great significance for the students in both primary and secondary schools. Meanwhile, the orientation of education and the professional-skills composition of the manpower trained in various educational institutions that it determines, as is noted in ECA documents, does not yet meet national needs. And at a time when

millions of dollars are being spent on foreign specialists, a large number of trained Africans are working outside the continent or are supplementing the ranks of the unemployed.

Africa inherited massive illiteracy from the era of colonialism, and schooling has little reach among children and adolescents. The paramount task under those conditions is the democratization of education, and the majority of the countries have achieved significant successes in that. Their constitutions include a provision on the right to education and its compulsory and free nature in elementary school. Budget appropriations for the needs of education were increased, and its material and technical base was expanded. Children and youth of the corresponding ages were more than 70 percent encompassed by elementary school, 14 percent by secondary schools and 1.8 percent by higher education in 1980 across Africa overall¹⁵.

The problem of the democratization of education thus remains as yet unsolved. Even primary education—not to mention secondary and higher education—is far from accessible to all children (especially rural children), and it moreover must be paid for in the majority of the capitalist-oriented countries. An acute shortage of school buildings, textbooks and skilled teachers and instructors is felt everywhere, all the more acutely where the level of economic development is lower. The socialist-oriented states have at the same time achieved more success overall than the countries developing along the capitalist path. One piece of evidence for this is the fact that the average level of literacy, 47 percent in the middle of the 1980s¹⁶, is surpassed in the majority of the states in this group. The same could be said of elementary and secondary education for the children.

The undoubted successes of the socialist-oriented countries in the sphere of education include the abolition of discrimination among students by racial, estate, religious or gender traits; the separation of the schools from the churches and the secular nature of teaching (only in Algeria, where Islam has been declared the state religion, is its study included in the curriculum); the creation of a unified state system of education; the fact that education is free for all students; a significant reduction in territorial irregularities in the distribution of educational institutions; the Africanization, albeit incomplete, of classroom teaching; and finally, the growing polytechnical nature of education.

Many difficulties and problems remain at the same time. They are first and foremost the shortage of skilled pedagogical personnel, as well as facilities; the schism—which, although it is being reduced, is preserved—in the inclusion of urban and rural youth; high indicators of staying back and dropping out (in Algeria, for example, roughly just half of those entering elementary school finished it in the 1970s); the low level of inclusion of instruction in secondary school; the clearly inadequate scope of professional and technical education, and much more.

The failure to solve these problems is having an appreciable effect on the quality level of schooling and, consequently, the level of training of personnel, especially in secondary technical fields. It is ultimately reflected in the dynamics of labor productivity and economic growth rates thereby. The further development of the educational system in the African countries is thus considered to be a vitally important task and essential condition for advancing along the path of social progress overall.

This advance is also largely connected with the emergence of the system of medical care as an element of the social infrastructure essential for improving the health of the population and the reproduction and efficient utilization of labor resources. The situation in that realm remains grave despite the marked positive shifts in the post-colonial period. It is typified by the still high level of general and infant mortality, general and infectious morbidity associated with the everyday living conditions of the broad masses, an acute lack of hospitals and clinics, medical personnel, medicines, the poor development of medical care in rural areas or health and sanitation services in the cities etc.

After attempts to copy Western models of medical care in the 1960s—which failed in view of the narrowness of economic capabilities—attention toward primary medical and health care and the prevention of disease as one of the principal directions for the development of health care grew stronger in the African countries. The link between a high level of disease and the insufficient provision of food and drinking water to the population (just one in four people in Africa has access to clean water overall)¹⁷, overpopulation of the cities, intensive migration etc. was more and more clearly revealed therein. The high degree of dependence of the overall state of health care in each country on the solution of other social problems was consequently also revealed. This naturally does not remove the necessity of systematic efforts in the health-care field itself. The African nations carried out the construction of rural health-care centers, expanded the network of primary-care and sanitation assistance and trained medical personnel—the lack of which, especially at the middle and lower levels, remains exceedingly acute—to the extent of their capabilities in the 1970s and 1980s. A rationalization of the selection and distribution of medicines was performed with the assistance of the World Health Organization. Interaction between contemporary and popular medicine, the services of which are used by no less than 4/5 of the population of the continent¹⁸, has been arranged in many countries.

Health-care policy in each of the countries, in the face of the aims common to all of them, has specific traits that are defined, aside from everything else, by the orientation of social development. The following specific features of this policy in the socialist-oriented countries can be noted:

—the planned nature and the broad scale of the fight against disease and a reliance on preventing them;

—the active role of public organizations in the local areas (peasant associations in Ethiopia, rural development committees in Tanzania and the like) in realizing the programs of primary medical, sanitation aid and other measures of a health-care nature;

—the democratization of health care, and free medical care at all levels. (This principle is contradicted to a certain extent, however, by the presence of a private sector of medical care.)

—increased attention to the training of middle- and lower-level medical personnel for the purpose of better providing primary medical care in rural areas; and

—the widespread utilization of traditional medicine with the active involvement of the agents of it in the basic principles of scientific medicine.

The undoubted achievements of the African countries in the realm of health care are nonetheless inadequate to satisfy existing needs. The fact that roughly just half of the population was provided with medical care in the 39 countries of the continent for which the corresponding data exist in the first half of the 1980s testifies to this¹⁹. Many governments are planning increased health-care measures, especially in rural areas, in the next few years. They can scarcely be implemented, however, without outside financial assistance.

IV.

A survey of some elements of the social policy of the African nations testifies to the no small amount of progress they have achieved, especially in the spheres of education and health care. But the situation remains an exceedingly strained one, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. It even worsened in the 1980s, as expressed in the curtailment of a number of social programs. The food crisis grew worse under the conditions of the continuing population explosion, which agriculture was unable to keep up with. The increased outflow of the rural population to the city is worsening the problems of employment, pauperism and social defenselessness for broader and broader masses. Social ferment is expanding and internal contradictions of both a class and an ethnic and religious nature are growing stronger under these conditions.

The increasing negative trends in the socio-economic sphere have naturally affected the socialist-oriented states as well. Those of them that have to repel the subversive activities of domestic and foreign reaction are experiencing especially serious difficulties. Critics of the concept of non-capitalist development are inclined to see evidence of its failure and insolvency in this. This way of formulating the issue, I am convinced, is clearly incorrect. The deterioration of the socio-economic climate on the continent was caused principally by factors that have no relation whatsoever to the type of orientation of social development (the worsening of foreign economic conditions, natural disasters). One also cannot fail to

take into account, of course, certain negative consequences of the unjustified forcing of social transformations in regard to the socialist-oriented countries as well. But objective factors played the chief role in the worsening situation nonetheless. It (the worsening) was manifested to an equal extent in the countries taking the capitalist direction, which also gives grounds to speak of the dead-end nature of it.

The use of the fact that the socialist-oriented states do not surpass the capitalist-oriented ones in the extent of resolution of socio-economic problems—and, consequently, that this course cannot have an attractive and “demonstrative” influence on broad segments of the population in those countries—as proof of the “failure” of socialist orientation is also invalid. The fact itself is indisputable. But it proves exactly nothing. It is also, in my opinion, incorrect to compare the efficacy of the two orientations over the course of such a brief period of alternative development for the African states by historical standards (less than 30 years, and more often less than 15)²⁰.

The following of socialist orientation is not a short-term action, but a prolonged historical period. Its substance is not “the building of socialism,” but a policy of preserving and multiplying existing productive forces within a framework of the co-existence and competition of various methods of economic operation. This is, in the academic, Leninist understanding, a way of skirting (or averting) the stage of the sway of capitalism and the gradual surmounting of private-ownership forms of production (without their complete elimination being obligatory) with collectivist ones.

The “refutation” of the socialist orientation of development is pursued with the aid of arguments that are, at the very least, unconvincing. Facts that testify just to the harm of jumping ahead, haste and the pursuit of this policy (rushing in the cause of nationalizing ownership of the means of production, excessive scope of it etc.) are used, along with indicators associated basically with a worsening of general economic conditions, to prove the theory of its insolvency. Steps to correct such distortions or to ensure the effectiveness of the state and cooperative sectors are evaluated by critics as a “natural” digression from socialist orientation. Non-capitalist development in the Leninist understanding of this course and deformations in it caused by measures that are economically inadequately prepared are put on the same level as a result.

A few more words on one of the “arguments” against socialist orientation that can be heard from some of its opponents. It supposedly “negates” the natural historical progression of social development, and is thus not only not progressive, but is even effectively “reactionary” (!). This accusation is possible only with an understanding of capitalism as an absolutely essential and irreplaceable stage in the development of liberated countries, and socialist orientation as a stage in the building of

socialism. The former is at least debatable, while the latter, as has been noted, is simply incorrect.

The step-by-step and ascending development of productive forces caused by the replacement of types of productive and other social relations comprises the foundation of the natural historical progression of social development. In the words of K. Marx, the purpose of these types, including the capitalist, is “to provide sufficient space” for productive forces²¹. In many developing countries with an especially low level of productive forces, however, which includes the majority of the socialist-oriented African states, “almost homogeneous traditional masses that dispense with capitalism in its most developed forms and are receptive only to forms of simple commodity production predominate.”²²

An orientation toward socialism, being in its socio-economic essence not the “building of socialism” but a process of resolving tasks that under a different nature of political superstructure are resolved on the path of encouraging capitalism under certain political conditions (the anti-bourgeois nature of the superstructure of society), far from “negates” the natural historical progression of social development. A correct policy of socialist orientation cannot ignore the specific socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions. It can be successful, in other words, only as far as it correlates with those conditions. This means that non-capitalist (collectivist) methods of economic operation can be employed only to the extent that the socio-psychological readiness of the workers permits. This further means that the quantitative predominance of collectivist forms of production is not obligatory for socialist orientation at all. The main thing is the socio-economic quality, not the quantity, of those forms, in the collectivist and non-exploitative nature of labor, the assurance of better results of production than in the private-ownership sector and the facilitation of the gradual spatial (quantitative) expansion of collectivist forms. This process cannot help but be a prolonged one. The essence of it is the gradual transformation of an economically collectivized (i.e. with greater labor productivity) sector of production into a leading and system-forming one. Such a transformation is not realistic, however, without support on the part of the political superstructure of society. This support also comprises the chief function of socialist orientation, which cannot or will not be understood by its critics.

Returning to the socio-economic policy of the African states, it could be said that its nature is undoubtedly largely formed by the orientation of social development and the social nature of power. This policy at the same time proceeds from the state of as yet far from overcome backwardness and multilateral dependence on the centers of the world capitalist economy that is characteristic of all the countries, albeit to varying degrees.

A certain commonality of socio-economic policy is associated with the commonality of the initial situation. First of all, in the goals: these aims are real and alike for both

groups of states both in a broad sense (ensuring economic and social progress) and in a more concrete sense (growth in production, a rise in the standard of living, the development of the social infrastructure etc.). Second, in the nature of the obstacles to achieving the aims posed: all of the African countries, whatever their orientation may be, are in general experiencing difficulties of the same order in realizing their development programs. They are first and foremost the clear inadequacy of the resource base and the acute lack of skilled personnel. Attempts to surmount these difficulties with the aid of foreign resources have led to the formation of enormous indebtedness, which has become a powerful drag on socio-economic progress.

All of this inevitably muffles (at this stage, in any case) differences in the orientation of development. The crisis situation of the economies of the African countries in the 1980s has expanded the "supra-alternative" commonality of methods of economic operation and social construction, basically through the pragmatization of a socialist orientation of development that has, to a certain extent, corrected the distortions of the past. The general direction of this policy is a lessening or rejection of strict administrative regulation of the economy, a rise in the efficiency of the state sector and, in some countries, its partial privatization and the incorporation of new forms of economic management based on the widespread utilization of cost controls, and the stimulation of market relations and private small and medium-sized business without, of course, permitting the uncontrolled expansion of private-capital elements.

The discussion in the social sphere concerns the rejection of unjustifiably forced transformations of traditional structures that not only does not accelerate, but rather slow socio-economic progress, as the experience of agricultural cooperation in some African countries has shown. According to the valid observation of N.A. Simoniya, "it is namely the desire to 'eliminate'—and as fast as possible—traditional structures that comprises the chief error of the transitional period in these countries. It is in fact impossible to perform this task overnight, and matters are naturally reduced to the formal confinement of the peasant masses into pseudo-socialist organizational frameworks... that not only provide the state with opportunities for control over the villages that were unprecedented in the historical past, but also slow up for decades the step-by-step development of society toward genuine socialism."²³

Finally, political and ideological elements of pragmatization are manifested in the more realistic evaluations of the situation in various realms of social development, more sober "automatic descriptions" of some regimes and parties (Ethiopia), the achievement of intelligent compromises with political opponents within the country (Zimbabwe) and the "freezing," "burial" or compromise resolution of disputes with other countries (the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia or Angola and Mozambique with South Africa).

The root cause of these changes and trends was, as was noted above, the serious worsening of the economic situation and the indicators of development in recent years. The crisis situation of the economy is forcing the revolutionary-democratic leadership to seek the resolution of acute problems on paths that do not correspond to some of the former postulates of non-capitalist development but are no less realistic or essential. And it is not important whether these steps are implemented at their own initiative (Algeria) or to a significant extent under pressure from the IMF or the World Bank (motivated, naturally, by political as well as economic considerations) in exchange for additional financial assistance (Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania).

A strengthening of realistic trends in socio-economic development and the elimination of distortions that have inflicted more and more obvious harm do not discredit a socialist orientation of social development, but on the contrary re-animate it. This political course is a long-term one, and its fate is not determined by factors of an opportunistic nature. It is a course that has a potentially broad social base in the person of the workers and the hapless masses of the city and the village. It assumes the presence of a quite solid economic base—the public sector of the economy. And, no less importantly, the profound conviction of the revolutionary-democratic leadership of the historical necessity of pursuing that policy. That conviction is one of the indispensable conditions for the viability of socialist orientation.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin. Complete Collected Works, Vol. 43, pp 211-212.
2. See: "Afrikanskaya derevnya vchera i segodnya" [The African Village Yesterday and Today]. Moscow, 1987, pp 146-147. "...Not only under socialist orientation... but under capitalist as well... is the interaction between the state in its various functions and all of the social types of production existing in the agrarian economy... raised to a higher level" ("Derevnya Vostoka: ot sotsialnoy napryzhennosti k politicheskoy borbe" [The Village in the Orient: From Social Tension to Political Struggle]. Moscow, 1987, p 32).
3. ECA and Africa's Development. 1983-2008. Addis Ababa, 1983, p 23.
4. The Financial Times. 17 Sep 87.
5. ECA and Africa's Development..., p 23.
6. Ibid.
7. Sources the same as in the table.
8. V.A. Melyantsev. "Ekonomicheskiy rost stran Magriba" [Economic Growth of the Countries of the Maghreb]. Moscow, 1984, pp 105-108.

9. ECA. Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa. 1982-1983, Conacry, 1984, p 119.

10. Republic of Zimbabwe. First Five-Year National Development Plan. 1986-1990. Vol. 1. Harare, 1986, p 18.

11. Nations Unies. Conseil Economique et Social. Doc. E/ECA/HRP/TC/84/6. 1984, p 19. According to other estimates, a relative growth in poverty also occurs. According to UNICEF data, the share of Africans living in "absolute poverty" increased from 82 percent in 1974 to 91 percent in 1982.

12. ECA and Africa's Development..., p 8.

13. Doc. E/ECA/HRP/TC/84/6, p 13.

14. See: Zimbabwe's Prospects. Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa. London, 1988, p 281.

15. ECA and Africa's Development..., p 8.

16. ECA. Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa. 1985-1986. Addis Ababa, 1987, p A-17.

17. ECA and Africa's Development..., p 8.

18. "Sotsialnaya politika gosudarstv Afriki" [Social Policy of the African Nations]. Moscow, 1988, p 174.

19. ECA. Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa. 1986-1987. Niamey, 1988, p 188.

20. It is appropriate to recall here that the "clarification of the relations" between feudalism and capitalism in Europe continued, as F. Engels noted, for two centuries before capitalist production became dominant (with the appearance of large-scale industry at the end of the 18th century). See: K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, Vol. 20, p 152.

21. K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, Vol. 13, p 7.

22. A.A. Sterbalova. Problems of Non-Capitalist Development.—RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREM. MIR. 1988, No 2, p 143.

23. N. Simoniya. The Leninist Concept of the Transition to Socialism and the Countries of the Orient.—AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA. 1988, No 4, p 4.

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New Look at Truman Doctrine and Stalinist Diplomacy

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[Article by A.Sh. Rasizade: "The Turkish Aspect of the Truman Doctrine and Some of the Mistakes of Stalinist Diplomacy"]

[Text] Although the events in Greece and the situation surrounding Turkey were the immediate cause for the proclamation of the doctrine, neither the Greek nor the Turkish aspects of it have been the subject of special study here. The Truman Doctrine has meanwhile determined the development of American-Turkish relations and Turkey's choice of its place in the postwar world, which has naturally also had an effect on Soviet-Turkish relations. The choice of Turkey is partly explained by the position of the Soviet Union and the faulty foreign-policy concepts of I.V. Stalin.

The British Embassy in Washington asked for a meeting of the British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, with U.S. Secretary of State Marshall on 21 Feb 47 in order to convey two important notes concerning the situation in Greece and Turkey. In view of the fact that George Marshall has left for Princeton University in New Jersey for his first speech as secretary of state, his deputy Dean Acheson proposed that the embassy send copies of those notes to the State Department so that the necessary work could be begun. The copies of the notes were received by the head of the Near East desk of the State Department, Lloyd Henderson, and his staffers at once set about preparing a memorandum on the issue, which was ready before the formal delivery of the British notes to G. Marshall on February 24.

In those notes the British government informed the United States that as of 1 Apr 47, England would cease to render financial assistance to Greece and Turkey in view of their own difficulties, and they asked the American government to take upon itself the rendering of economic and military aid to those two countries. The note concerning Turkey expressed alarm on the score of its international position and shared the following conclusions of the British military leadership: "a) The preservation of Turkish independence is of the greatest importance; b) the Turkish armed forces in their current state are unable to offer effective resistance to aggression on the part of a world power; c) at the current level of training of the Turkish armed forces, offering them modern weaponry would not greatly increase their combat potential; and d) the chiefs of staff feel that the Turkish Army must be re-armed on a very large scale, but this task cannot be performed by the United Kingdom due to a lack of human resources and production capabilities. This problem could thus be resolved by the United States."²

It can be seen from the notes of the discussion between Marshall and Inverchapel when handing over the notes that the Turkish government had not been informed of the British decision to appeal to the United States for help and to halt financial assistance: "He (Inverchapel) added that it would probably be disastrous to inform the Greeks and Turks of this if they could not be informed simultaneously that the U.S. government had definite plans to assist them."

In reply to the notes, Marshall sent British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin a telegram that asked directly

whether this step signified a "fundamental change in British policy." Bevin answered in the negative, adding that "the freedom of Greece and Turkey is absolutely essential to Anglo-American and Western European security and the stability of the Middle East. But the burden of supporting these countries is such that Britain cannot bear it alone any more."³

Thus appeared the grounds for the advancement of the Truman Doctrine, which was proclaimed by the president of the United States two weeks later from the podium of Congress, essentially declaring the beginning of the Cold War. Much has been written of the global significance of the Truman Doctrine. I will thus not repeat the well-known truths of its role in worsening Soviet-American relations and determining the new direction of U.S. foreign policy, the postwar structure in Europe and the Far East and the transition to a protracted period of cold war.

Even though the events in Greece and the situation surrounding Turkey were the immediate cause for the proclamation of the doctrine, however, neither the Greek nor the Turkish aspects of it have been the subject of special study here.⁴

The Truman Doctrine meanwhile played an enormous role in American-Turkish relations, becoming something of a turning point in their development and in the choice by Turkey of its place in the postwar world, which also had an effect on Soviet-Turkish relations.

The author has attempted in this article to correct somewhat the existing slant in Soviet treatments of the Truman Doctrine. Today, when we are evaluating our past in a new way, it is useful to show the consequences of the erroneous approach of I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov to Soviet-Turkish relations.

Objective academic analysis will furthermore provide us with a deeper understanding of the motive forces of the American-Turkish partnership, since the principles of the Truman Doctrine remain even today the foundation of the mutual relations between those two nations.

So then, what were the extraordinary circumstances that forced Great Britain, the great power that was "roaming" Greece and Turkey at the time, to ask for the immediate intervention of the United States? Civil war was continuing in Greece, where British troops remained at the time, as is well known, and the monarchy was on the brink of collapse. As for Turkey, with which England had concluded a treaty of alliance as early as 19 Oct 39, both its economic and its domestic-policy situations were stable. This cannot be said of the international situation of the country, and more precisely, about its relations with the USSR.

Soviet-Turkish relations had reached a maximum degree of tension by 1947. This was explained partly by the hostile anti-Soviet policy of the Turkish leadership during World War II⁵. The Soviet government, in view of the worsening relations, had decided to denounce the

Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between the USSR and Turkey that had been signed in Paris in 1925 and which was expiring in 7 Nov 45. People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov made a declaration to Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper on 19 Mar 45 that said that "as a consequence of the profound changes that have occurred over the course of World War II, this treaty no longer corresponds to the new situation and is in need of serious improvement."⁶ On 4 Apr 45 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Saka informed the Soviet government, through its ambassador in Ankara, S.A. Vinogradov, of Turkey's readiness to conclude a new treaty and to study the Soviet proposals on that score⁷.

The Soviet proposals that followed in connection with the discussion of a new treaty, however, worsened bilateral relations still more, which facilitated a strengthening of the pro-Western stance of Turkey. The diplomatic debate over the terms of use of the Black Sea straits that was soon to begin in Potsdam also led to this⁸.

Claims against the portion of Turkish territory adjoining Georgia and Armenia were advanced with the consent of Stalin. PRAVDA reprinted a long article from the Tbilisi newspaper KOMMUNISTI by Georgian Academicians S. Dzhnashia and N. Berdzenishvili called "Our Legitimate Demands Against Turkey."⁹ The Soviet press published a petition by foreign Armenian organizations to the great powers demanding the transfer the eastern vilayets of Turkey to the Armenian SSR in order to accommodate Armenian repatriates returning to their homeland, which for the times was equivalent to tacit approval of that demand¹⁰.

Demands that were unacceptable to the Turks were advanced in the debates over the terms of the Black Sea straits as well, which led to the devising of a unified Anglo-American-Turkish position against the Soviet proposals¹¹. The USSR ambassador in Ankara delivered a note to the government on 8 Aug 46 with positions on the principles for new terms for the straits, the fifth clause of which stated: "Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers with the greatest vested interest and most able to ensure the freedom of trade navigation and security in the straits, will organize the defense of the straits through joint efforts to prevent the utilization of the straits by other nations for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers."¹²

The idea of the appearance of Soviet military facilities on the shores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles together with the Soviet claims pushed Turkey even further away from our country. The further development of events, under the conditions of the Cold War that had now begun, led logically to the entry of Turkey into NATO in 1952. The Soviet government, taking stock of the situation that had been created, made a belated attempt to normalize relations with Turkey immediately after the death of Stalin. Molotov made a statement to the

Turkish ambassador in Moscow, F.H. Hozar, in the name of the Soviet government on 30 May 53, which I cite below in its entirety:

"As is well known, the question of the settlement of Soviet-Turkish relations was touched on in official talks of the representatives of both nations several years ago in connection with the expiration of the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1925. Some territorial claims of the Armenian SSR and Georgian SSR against Turkey, as well as the considerations of the Soviet government relative to eliminating the possible threat to the security of the USSR on the part of the Black Sea straits, figured in those talks. This was perceived in an unhealthy fashion by government and public circles in Turkey, which could not help but be reflected in Soviet-Turkish relations to a certain extent. The governments of Armenia and Georgia, in the name of preserving good-neighbor relations and reinforcing peace and security, consider it possible to repudiate their territorial claims against Turkey. As for the question of the straits, the Soviet government has reconsidered its former opinion on that issue and feels that it is possible to ensure the security of the USSR on the part of the straits under conditions that are alike for both the USSR and for Turkey. The Soviet government thus declares that the Soviet Union has no territorial claims against Turkey."¹³

The attitude toward Turkey had been extremely cool in the United States right up until 1947. As a consequence of the fact that representatives of almost exclusively oppressed peoples (Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Balkan Slavs and Levantine Arabs, among others) had emigrated to the United States from the Ottoman Empire, a hostile attitude toward the Turkish state had become established in American public opinion. This was also facilitated by the authoritarian nature of the rule of the Atatürk, which contradicted American notions of democracy, and the pro-German neutrality of Turkey in World War II.

It is difficult to say how much more time would have been required for an American-Turkish rapprochement, which had begun with the debate over the terms of the straits, had there been no Truman Doctrine. The traditional Turkish policy of Washington was altered with striking swiftness in 1947.

"Everyone who took part in the extraordinary events of that period realized that a very important turning point in American history was taking place," recalled the author of the text of the Truman speech to Congress, J. Jones¹⁴.

The day after the delivery of the British notes, a meeting was held among three departments—State, Army and Navy—and the memorandum "Position and Recommendations of the State Department in Relation to Direct Assistance for Greece and Turkey" was prepared, coming to the conclusion that the United States could and should replace England in Greece and Turkey¹⁵.

On February 26, considering the consequences of such a step, Marshall, Acheson, Secretary of Defense G. Forrestal and his deputy, R. Patterson, came to a unified opinion on the necessity of rendering immediate American assistance to Greece and Turkey. President Truman approved their recommendations that same day. "Their conclusions were essentially the same I had come to myself... If Greece were lost, Turkey would become unsuited for defense as an outpost in a sea of communism. In precisely the same way, if Turkey conceded to the Soviet demands, the position of Greece would have been subject to extreme danger," he said in his memoirs¹⁶.

The U.S. administration thus quickly made the basic decision to replace England. It was now necessary to obtain the approval of Congress. The president decided to first meet with its leaders for this purpose. Whether the Congress—elected under the slogan of cutting budget spending and monitored by the opposition Republican Party—would allocate the funds for pursuing the projected aid program would depend on their support.

The meeting with the leaders of Congress was held on February 27 in the White House. Present were the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee A. Vandenberg, Democratic member of the committee T. Connally, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee S. Bridges, Speaker of the House of Representatives G. Martin, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman C. Eaton and other members of Congress. Marshall spoke to them, accusing the USSR of waging a "war of nerves" and forcing the Turks to maintain a mobilized army, while showing that "only the United States can render effective aid"¹⁷ to Turkey. This did not, however, make the proper impression on the members of Congress.

The meeting at the White House was well described by Acheson, who recalls that seeing the skeptical attitude of the legislators, he asked for the floor and spoke not so much of the plan for aid to Greece and Turkey as he did of what was concealed behind the aid to those two countries. Acheson described in dramatic tones the situation that had taken shape surrounding Turkey, and presented the events in Iranian Azerbaijan and the civil war in Greece as attempts by the USSR to surround Turkey. He skillfully used the Soviet claims and proposals toward Turkey to intimidate the congressmen with the "Russian threat." Asserting that the "loss" of Turkey and Greece would be reflected in the situation in Europe, he convinced them the United States, by rendering aid to these countries, would ensure its own security. This reasoning produced the requisite impression on the leaders of Congress. Senator Vandenberg answered on their behalf: "Mr. President, if you tell all of this to Congress and the country, I will support you, and I think the majority of the members will do the same."¹⁸

The opinion of U.S. military circles relative to Turkish aid was represented in a memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed by General Eisenhower, U.S. Army

Chief of Staff at the time: "During peacetime Turkey occupies a key position in relation to the Middle East and the Arab world... In wartime Turkey is the sole barrier against a Russian offensive against the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East... The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that effective aid to Turkey is important to the security of the United States, but that aid includes political, economic and psychological factors that are paramount compared to the military factor. All of these factors are so interwoven that no one of them can be singled out and considered apart from the others."¹⁹

In spite of the assurances of Senator Vandenberg, the legislators had a cold reception for the report of a new and expensive foreign-policy program. Approval for the Turkish program, however, was facilitated by the fact that the Truman administration linked it with the emergency aid to Greece, which had many advocates in Congress²⁰.

The author of "containment" himself, G. Kennan, at the time head of the planning department at the State Department, disapproved of this ruse by the Truman government: "I suspected that... the Pentagon was making use of a favorable confluence of circumstances for the purpose of including a military program for Turkey into legislation that was being offered chiefly as a political and economic program for Greece."²¹

On 12 Mar 47 President Truman spoke to a joint session of both houses of Congress to set forth his doctrine. It was stated in the Turkish section of the message to Congress that American support was necessary to ensure the territorial integrity of Turkey. "This integrity is essential to preserve order in the Middle East," declared Truman. "If Turkey wants to receive the essential aid, the United States should grant it. We are the sole country able to offer such aid... If Greece were to fall under the control of an armed minority, it would have a direct and serious effect on its neighbor, Turkey. Confusion and disorder could spread throughout the Middle East... In the event of the absence of aid for Greece and Turkey at this fateful hour, the consequences will be grave for both East and West. I therefore ask the Congress to grant the authority to render aid to Greece and Turkey in the amount of 400 million dollars for the period until 30 Jun 48."²² Some 150 million dollars were earmarked for Turkey. The president moreover requested authority to dispatch "civilian and military personnel at the request of those countries."

Now let's look at how the capitals with the greatest interest—Ankara, London and Moscow—reacted to Truman's speech. The reaction of the ruling circles of Turkey was enthusiastic. U.S. ambassador Wilson reported on March 14 from Ankara that "Several members of the Turkish government, deputies etc. have expressed to me a high regard for the president's message on aid to Greece and Turkey. Erkin (general secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey—A.R.) told me that President İnönü is very pleased."²³ In an interview with a group of American journalists, Prime Minister R.

Peker, acknowledging that the state was spending half of its budget for the maintenance of a 750,000-man army, said, "We will thus be grateful to the United States for assistance satisfying the broad needs of our country."²⁴ Opposition leader C. Bayar (the next president of the republic) declared that "We greet the aid proposal of President Truman with great satisfaction and gratitude."²⁵ There were characteristically absolutely no differences whatsoever between the Turkish government and the opposition on issues of foreign policy in general and American aid in particular.

In London, Prime Minister C. Attlee and Foreign Minister E. Bevin felt that the solution of the Greco-Turkish problem had been shifted into safe hands, and the British government thereby considered its mission fulfilled²⁶. Opposition leader W. Churchill "warmly welcomed" the Truman speech while speaking at the Conservative Party conference that was being held at the time²⁷.

Debates on the score of the American action were held in the House of Commons on March 17. The members of the British Parliament, as opposed to the U.S. Congress, displayed much more interest in the Turkish part of the Truman message²⁸. Foreign Minister G. Michael spoke on behalf of the government. It was revealed in his answer to a question by MP F. Price that the Turkish government itself had not appealed to either England or the United States for aid, but that the British government, in the words of Michael, "was simply sure of certain economic and military needs of Turkey."²⁹

The new direction proclaimed by Truman naturally evoked alarm in the Soviet Union. The lead article of PRAVDA expressed the opinion of the Soviet leadership on American military aid to Turkey: "There is no need to prove that nothing threatens the national integrity of Turkey. The idea of 'modernization' that Truman referred to is consequently reduced to affirming American military dominion in Turkey as well."³⁰

On 7 Apr 47 USSR permanent ambassador to the United Nations A.A. Gromyko spoke at the Security Council with a statement which said in particular: "The measures being undertaken by the government of the United States in relation to Greece and Turkey are inflicting serious harm to the reputation of the United Nations and are engendering an inevitable mistrust in the mutual relations among the UN member states... Objectivity and justice demand the acknowledgment that Turkey has no such right to receive outside aid, since it is not a country that suffered in the war. Its territory was not subjected to occupation. The efforts of the Allies to draw Turkey into involvement in the overall fight of the United Nations against the fascist aggressors, as is well known, did not have positive results."³¹

The Soviet government expressed its opposition to the military aid for Turkey, and it proposed that economic aid to Greece be rendered through the UN; the USSR offered a corresponding draft resolution to the Security Council. Four members of the Security Council (Great

Britain, Australia, Belgium and Brazil) voted against the Soviet draft, two voted for it (the USSR and Poland) and five abstained, including the United States. The UN Security Council thus tacitly sanctioned the rendering of military aid to Turkey by the United States.

The legislative drafting of the program meanwhile proceeded in Washington. Objections were advanced in both houses of Congress in the course of discussion of the "Bill to Grant Aid to Greece and Turkey" whose essence was reduced to the following: the behavior of Turkey in World War II had compromised it in the eyes of the American voters; the Turkish regime clearly did not conform to the American notion of democracy, and it was thus difficult to justify supporting it; Turkey, as opposed to Greece, was not in a critical situation and even possessed large foreign-currency reserves; American activeness in Turkey would cause unease in Moscow and would inevitably facilitate a worsening of relations between the USSR and the United States; a military alliance with such an unstable and warlike partner as Turkey was fraught with the danger of dragging the United States into a Soviet-Turkish conflict; the United States, taking on the burden of supporting Turkey, "was pulling England's chestnuts from the fire"; and, the issue should be handed over for UN consideration³².

Senators A. Vandenberg and T. Connally, on the other hand, spoke of the Soviet threat to Turkey, even though the presidential message had not once specifically mentioned the Soviet Union³³. "It is well known that Turkey is under constant external threat," asserted Connally³⁴. Vandenberg, calling Turkey "the sole truly independent country remaining on the borders of the Soviet Union from the Baltic to the Black Sea," drew an analogy between the situation that had been created surrounding Turkey and the Munich agreement, which forced the USSR into the role of aggressor, and supported the opinion that a lack of U.S. intervention would come to a lamentable end³⁵.

The advocates of the program presented other arguments to Congress that Vandenberg called "intelligent intrinsic interests of the United States." They were reduced chiefly to strategic military considerations and sounded very convincing: it was enough to look at the map to understand the importance of establishing American influence in a country whose territory occupied a dominant position simultaneously in such important regions as the Near East, the Balkans, the Transcaucasus and the eastern Mediterranean and made it possible to control the Black Sea straits.

Coordinated legislation was finally approved by Congress on May 15, although the amount of the appropriation for Turkey was reduced to 100 million dollars nonetheless. President Truman signed the Act to Provide Assistance to Greece and Turkey in Kansas City on 22 May 47.

The law consisted of an extensive preamble and eight sections³⁶. The U.S. act was presented in the form of an

answer to a direct request by the governments of Greece and Turkey for "immediate financial and other assistance essential to preserve their national integrity and their survival as free countries." Section 1 defined the forms of the assistance: 1) financial aid in the form of loans, credits, gifts and the like; 2) the sending of people "in the service of the U.S. government" to those countries; 3) the sending of "a limited number of U.S. servicemen to help these countries exclusively as advisors"; 4) the granting of essential goods, services and information and the training of the personnel of these countries; and 5) the payment of the essential expenses, including administrative. Section 3 of the law set forth six preliminary conditions to which the country receiving American aid should consent. The most important of these was consent to unrestricted monitoring of the use of the aid on the part of the U.S. government. Section 5 defined the circumstances under which the U.S. president was prescribed to halt the aid: 1) if the governments of Greece or Turkey request it; 2) if a corresponding resolution is submitted by the UN Security Council or General Assembly (the so-called Vandenberg Amendment); 3) if the U.S. president decides that the mission of the law has been fulfilled in another manner or cannot be fulfilled at all; and 4) if he decides that the circumstances accepted as the foundation of Section 3 by the government of the country accepting the aid are not being observed. If the president does not halt the aid with such violations of the terms of the law, it is curtailed by resolution of both houses of Congress (as was done in 1975, when Congress imposed an embargo on military aid to Turkey against the will of the president). The president was further charged with the obligation to present Congress with quarterly reports on the implementation of the aid program³⁷. The creation of U.S. missions in both countries to implement the program and observe the use of the assistance was envisaged.

A military mission from the United States headed by General L. Oliver and composed of 22 U.S. Army and Navy officers and 2 economists from the State Department arrived in Turkey on May 23. Their mission included studying the needs of the Turkish armed forces and composing a plan for the distribution of the aid among the branches of service. Oliver presented his report a month and a half later. Without going into the details of it, I will cite just the recommended plan for the distribution of the first 100 million dollars allocated to Turkey by the Truman Doctrine: 48.5 million for the Turkish army, 14.75 for the navy, 26.75 for the air force, 5 for improving the country's strategic roads and 5 million for replenishing the contents of military arsenals³⁸.

Negotiations soon began in Ankara to work out the agreement in a climate of secrecy. The American delegation was headed by Ambassador E. Wilson, and the Turkish by Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Saka.

It is difficult to judge the substance of the negotiations, as no documentary sources have been published on it.

Fragmentary reports by American correspondents testify that they did not proceed without disagreement³⁹.

The American principle of monitoring the use of the aid was evidently painfully received in Turkey. This is entirely natural if one takes into account that any aid to the Ottoman Empire on the part of the great powers had in the past led to a strengthening of semi-colonial dependence and the appearance of such concepts as the "regime of capitulations," "Ottoman debt" etc. The Turkish government, after the Kemalist revolution that put an end to such phenomena, was extremely sensitive to violations of national sovereignty in any form, from Stalinist territorial claims to the American principle of "monitoring and observation."⁴⁰

Nothing remained for the Turkish delegation at the negotiations than to accept the American terms anyway. No differences whatsoever are detected in a comparison of the draft agreement with the text signed a month later.

E. Wilson and H. Saka signed the open-ended Agreement on Aid to Turkey at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12 Jul 47⁴¹. It repeated the provisions of the corresponding U.S. law.

The right of the United States to determine the time, nature and amount of the aid and monitor its utilization was legally fixed thereby. According to Article 3, moreover, the press and radio of the United States was granted the right to "free observance and complete coverage" of the course of program fulfillment, while the government of Turkey was obligated to make "completely and constantly known the aims, sources, nature, scale, quantity and results of this program" within the country. This is perhaps the first time in history that the Turkish government had been compelled to inform its own people in such a way.

Article 4 envisages steps to ensure the safekeeping and secrecy of the military supplies and information and the conditions for its use. The transfer of it "to anyone who is not an officer, member or representative of the government of Turkey, or its use for any purpose other than those for which these goods or information are granted" was prohibited without the consent of the U.S. government⁴².

Article 5 prohibited the Turkish government from using the American financial aid to pay its debts to other nations.

The discussion and ratification of the signed agreement by the Turkish parliament, despite the certain inequality of the parties, took just a few days, and the debates in the parliament moreover lasted only a day. H. Saka, on behalf of the government refuting the apprehensions of the deputies, tried to prove that the signed agreement did not contain a single provision that diminished the independence of Turkey and that, on the contrary, the United States was "guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Turkish Republic."⁴³

Some 339 votes were cast in favor of ratifying the agreement (the Great National Assembly numbered 465 members in all), and not one was cast against it. The absence of 126 deputies, however, suggests the idea of a passive boycott of the agreement on the part of enthusiastic supporters of national sovereignty.

The implementation of the Truman Doctrine in Turkey led quickly to profound and steady American influence on all spheres of the life of Turkish society, including foreign and domestic policy, the model of economic development, military doctrine, the infrastructure, finances, private enterprise, culture, education and the spheres of services and everyday life. This influence continues through the present day to one extent or another. It must be acknowledged herein that the process of Americanization, and then Europeanization (in the sense of Western European integration), has eased the counter aspirations of quite broad segments of Turkish society.

It is difficult to over-estimate the effects of the Truman Doctrine on the foreign policy of Turkey. Aside from a turnaround in relations with the United States, it essentially forced Ankara to reconsider its foreign-policy concepts completely. Turkey moved from a policy of non-alignment to the participation in military blocs in peacetime. New principles of foreign policy were devised over a brief time interval, culminating with the entry of Turkey into NATO. The Turkish government, sensing the support of Washington in 1947, began to pursue a more strict and irreconcilable anti-Soviet policy, and demonstratively recalled its ambassador to Moscow as early as February of 1948. "Turkey," in the expression of the American Turkish scholar L. Thomas, "chose sides in the Cold War."⁴⁴

As should have been expected, on 3 Apr 48 Congress allocated another 75 million for the period to 30 Jun 49 to supplement the 100 million dollars that had been appropriated to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine. This was done on the basis of the 1948 Law on Aid to Foreign Nations⁴⁵. State aid to Turkey from the United States was later economic—per the Marshall Plan of 1948-51, military—according to the U.S. Mutual Defense Act of 1949, technical—under the 1950 U.S. Law on International Development and, finally, under the Mutual Security Act of 10 Oct 51, which replaced all prior aid programs and united the military, economic and technical assistance to Turkey within the framework of the Agency for Mutual Security. The corresponding American-Turkish agreement was signed in Ankara on 7 Jan 52⁴⁶.

The Truman Doctrine at the same time left a number of unresolved issues in American-Turkish relations, chief among which was the fact that in rendering military assistance, Washington took upon itself no military or political obligations whatsoever. This gap became even more distinct with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 Apr 49. In Ankara they began

persistently seeking the conclusion of a treaty on American guarantees to Turkey for the development of the process begun by the Truman Doctrine. Turkish diplomacy did an enormous amount of work, the result of which was the acceptance of Turkey into the North Atlantic alliance.

American-Turkish relations shifted to a new quality and the rendering of assistance proceeded according to multilateral alliance programs with the entry of Turkey into NATO on 18 Feb 52. Bilateral aid agreements, however, were also concluded later on the basis of the agreement of 12 Jul 47, which remains in effect to this day.

Footnotes

1. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1947. Vol. 5 (The Near East and Africa). Washington, 1971, pp 35-37.

2. Ibid., p 44.

3. J. Connell. The "Office." London, 1958, pp 309-310.

4. Just two publications were devoted especially to the Turkish aspect of the Truman Doctrine in Soviet historiography: A.Sh. Rasizade. The Truman Doctrine as the Beginning of a New Stage in American Expansion in Turkey.—PROBLEMY VSEOBSHCHEY ISTORII. Moscow, 1973, pp 85-110; T.V. Konyakhina. The "Aid" to Turkey Under the Truman Doctrine.—NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1975. No 3, pp 135-143. Both of these works, based on archival documents from 1947 that were published by the U.S. State Department in 1971, contained a multitude of the scholastic theories typical of our historiography during the time of stagnation, and most importantly, the authors were silent on the role played by errors in Soviet diplomacy in 1945-46 in accelerating the Turkish-American rapprochement.

Of the literature published abroad, see, for example: D.J. Alvarez. Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-46. Thessaloniki, 1980; G.S. Harris. Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971. Washington, 1972; B.R. Kuniholm. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece. Princeton (New Jersey), 1980; P. Robinson. Impact of American Military and Economic Assistance Programs in Turkey. N.Y., 1956; M. Tamkoc. The Impact of the Truman Doctrine on the National Security Interests of Turkey.—FOREIGN POLICY. Ankara, 1977, Nos 3-4, pp 18-40; H. Ulman. Turk-Amerikan diplomatik munasebetleri (1939-1947). Ankara, 1961; S. Xydis. New Light on the Big Three Crisis over Turkey in 1945.—MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. 1960, Autumn, pp 416-432.

5. For more detail on the gradual worsening of Soviet-Turkish relations during the war years, see: The USSR and Turkey (1917-1979). Moscow, 1981, pp 157-186. The book by I. Vasilyev (under the pseudonym I.V. Samylovskiy) "O turetskom 'neytralitete' vo vtoroy

mirovoy voyne" [On Turkish "Neutrality" in World War II] (Moscow, 1951) provides a more accurate depiction of the immediate Soviet reaction to Turkish policy during the war years and the postwar atmosphere that took shape in mutual relations as a result.

6. IZVESTIYA, 21 Mar 45.

7. PRAVDA, 11 Apr 45.

8. The three great powers decided to reconsider the convention on the terms of use of the Black Sea straits that had been signed on 20 Jul 36 in Montreux (Switzerland) at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945. They proceeded from the following therein. According to the convention, Turkey was the sole country responsible for monitoring the terms of the straits. During the war years, however, it had violated Article 19 of the convention, which prohibited the passage of military vessels of the warring powers through the straits into the Black Sea in the event Turkey was not itself fighting. German and Italian naval vessels that were passed through by Turkey took part in combat operations on the Black Sea as the result of this.

9. See: PRAVDA, 20 Dec 45. The historical substantiation for these demands is contained in the monograph of D.S. Zavriyev "K noveyshey istorii severo-vostochnykh vilayetov Turtsii" [On the Recent History of the North-eastern Vilayets of Turkey] (Tbilisi, 1947).

10. See, for example: PRAVDA, 22 Feb 46. The discussion concerned the historical territory of Armenia from which the Armenians had been displaced in 1915 by the sultan's government of Turkey. For the negative effects of these demands on Soviet-Turkish relations see: C. Mouradian. Les relations sovieto-turques et la question armenienne depuis 1945.—ESPRIT. 1984, No 4, pp 114-127.

11. The diplomatic discussions of the USSR, United States, England and Turkey on reviewing the terms of the straits in 1945-46 played a substantial role in the deviation of Turkey away from friendly relations with our country and its rapprochement with the United States (visible testimony to this rapprochement was the visit of the battleship Missouri to Istanbul in April 1946. On the sense of the visit and its significance see: D. Alvarez. The "Missouri" Visit to Turkey.—BALKAN STUDIES. Thessaloniki, 1974, No 2, pp 225-236.) The issue of the straits could be considered the overture to the Turkish part of the Truman Doctrine. This topic, however, goes beyond the bounds of this article. The following works are recommended to readers interested in the discussion of the straits: K. Baltali. 1936-1956 yillari arasinda Bogazlar meselesi. Ankara, 1959; C. Bilsel. The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Correspondence.—American Journal of International Law. 1947, October, pp 727-747; F.C. Erkin. Les relations turco-sovietiques et la question des detroits. Ankara, 1968; H.N. Howard. Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy. Baltimore, 1974; J. Knight.

America's international Guarantees for the Straits; Prelude to the Truman Doctrine.—Middle Eastern Studies. 1977, No 2, pp 241-249; idem. American Statecraft and the 1946 Black Sea Straits Controversy.—Political Science Quarterly. 1975, No 3, pp 451-475; A. de Luca. Soviet-American Politics and the Turkish Straits.—Ibid. 1977, No 3, pp 503-524; F.A. Vali. The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford, 1972. The notes of the four powers on the problem of the straits have been entirely published by the United States State Department in a special anthology of diplomatic documents: The Problem of the Turkish Straits. Washington, 1947.

12. PRAVDA, 14 Aug 46.

13. PRAVDA, 19 Jul 53.

14. J. Jones. The Fifteen Weeks. N.Y., 1955, p vii.

15. Foreign Relations of the United States..., Vol. 5, p 53.

16. Harry S. Truman. Memoirs. Vol. 2. Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953. N.Y., 1956, p 100.

17. Foreign Relations of the United States..., Vol. 5, pp 61-62.

18. D. Acheson. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. N.Y., 1969, p 219.

19. Foreign Relations of the United States..., Vol. 5, pp 112-114.

20. American researcher G. Harris came to an analogous conclusion. See: G.S. Harris. Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Relations in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971. Washington, 1972, pp 25-26.

21. G.F. Kennan. Memoirs, 1925-1950. Boston, 1967, p 317.

22. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947. Washington, 1963, pp 176-180.

23. Foreign Relations of the United States..., Vol. 5, p 18.

24. The New York Times, 14 Mar 47. As then Times Ankara correspondent A. Humbaraci recalls, the Turkish premier added: "If a great democracy like America comes to help us, that means we are also a democracy." See: A. Humbaraci. Middle East Indictment. London, 1958, p 50.

25. Cumhuriyet. 14 Mar 47.

26. F. Williams. A Prime Minister Remembers. London, 1961, p 149.

27. The Times. 15 Mar 47.

28. See: Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons (March 17). Vol. 435. London, 1947, cols. 17-19.

29. Ibid., col. 18.

30. PRAVDA, 15 Mar 47.

31. IZVESTIYA, 9 Apr 47.

32. See: Congressional Record: House. Washington, 1947, pp 4700-4702 (May 7), 4798 (May 8), 4883-4884 (May 10); Congressional Record: Senate. Washington, 1947, p 3294 (April 10), 3467 (April 16).

33. Answering a direct question on whether it was the Soviet Union that he had in mind at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Acheson declared: "I know of no other country that would be a potential aggressor against Turkey" (Assistance to Greece and Turkey: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March 24-31, 1947. Washington, 1947, p 21).

34. Congressional Record: Senate. p 3275 (April 10).

35. Ibid., p 3195 (April 8).

36. An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey.—The Turkish Aid Program. (Department of State Publication). Washington, 1948, pp 18-21; A Decade of American Foreign Policy: 1941-1949. Basic Documents (U.S. Senate). Washington, 1950, pp 1257-1262.

37. The course of the implementation of the program is set forth in detail in a series of published reports: Assistance to Greece and Turkey: 1st-8th Reports to Congress by U.S. President. Washington, 1947-49.

38. Foreign Relations of the United States..., Vol. 5, pp 233-236.

39. A New York Times correspondent reported from Ankara that "The American aid program is being considered more critically here than it was met when it was announced two and some months ago" (The New York Times, 23 May 47). NEWSWEEK magazine reported in an article titled "Turkish Impertinence" that the Turks were demanding granting them the right to dispose of the aid individually "without interference on the part of American officials" (NEWSWEEK. 19 May 47, pp 21-22). As for the Turkish press, it kept silent on the course of the negotiations, obviously as the consequence of censorship bans.

40. Compare the conclusions of foreign researchers: G.S. Harris. Op. cit., p 27; H. Ulman. Op. cit., p 111.

41. Agreement on Aid to Turkey.—The Turkish Aid Program, pp 22-24; A Decade of American Foreign Policy..., pp 1265-1267; United Nations Treaty Series. Vol. 7. N.Y., 1947, pp 299-308.

42. President Johnson, in his famous letter of 5 Jun 64 to Prime Minister I. İnönü, which restrained the latter from military intervention in the communal strife on Cyprus, warned directly that the use of American arms in a landing on Cyprus would contradict Article 4 of the 1947 agreement, which prohibited the use of U.S. military deliveries for purposes not connected with the defense of Turkey without the consent of Washington (Middle East Journal).

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